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ABSTRACT 
 
In the first essay I examine the cash policies of female-led firms. Recent research finds that 
female CEOs eschew riskier corporate policies, but it makes contradicting claims whether this is due 
to risk aversion. Benchmarking risk aversion by the management of firms’ cash, I find that female 
CEOs are risk averse relative to male CEOs. Specifically, they hold significantly (18%) more cash, 
even for the same level of dividend payout as male CEOs. Further, they have significantly higher 
speed of adjustment for cash deficits, are more likely to use excess cash to increase dividends, but 
are equally likely to use it to increase investment. Collectively, these results indicate that greater risk 
aversion in the general female population continues beyond the glass ceiling and likely influences 
female CEOs’ corporate policies. Nonetheless, cash held by female CEOs has greater marginal 
value, suggesting a dividend-clientele effect.  
In the second essay I examine the impact of CEO gender on compensation keeping in view 
the corporate outcomes that they beget. Risk aversion may influence CEOs’ intertemporal choices 
and effort regarding short-term and long-term corporate activities. Given that females are more risk 
averse, I examine whether there are gender-based differences in short- and long-term corporate 
outcomes and whether these lead to gender-based disparity in CEO compensation. I find that 
female CEOs have significantly (10%) superior performance on short-term firm outcomes, but 
inferior (24%) performance on long-term outcomes, relative to male CEOs. However, for a given 
level of short-term (long-term) performance female CEOs obtain relatively more (less) short-term 
(short-term and long-term) compensation. The end result is that there is no difference in the total 
vi 
 
compensation between male and female CEOs. This suggests that female CEOs are well rewarded 
for their short-termism, enough to make up for their relative underperformance on long-term goals.
 1 
 
ESSAY 1 - DOES FEMALE RISK AVERSION GO BEYOND THE GLASS CEILING? 
Introduction 
“Women don’t take enough risks. Men are just ‘foot on the gas pedal’.”  
- Sheryl Sandberg (COO of Facebook) 
There is a growing presence of female executives in the top echelons of large public U.S. firms. At 
the end of 2012, there were 50 female CEOs in the top 1,500 public firms. Though only 3% of the 
total, this is nearly twice the number just a decade earlier and more than twelve times that in 1993. 
As female leadership of large public firms evolves there is an emerging literature that documents 
gender-based differences in corporate policies and divergence in corporate risk-taking (Kulich et al. 
(2011), Adams and Funk (2012), Adhikari (2012), Dittmar and Duchin (2013), Faccio et al. (2014), 
Huang and Kisgen (2013), Chen, Crossland, and Huang (2014), Francis et al., (2014)).  
What drives these differences is as yet unknown. Sociology and other disciplines have long 
documented a significant difference in risk aversion between males and females in the general 
population (Croson and Gneezy (2009)). Further, females generally engage in less financial risk-
taking (Barber and Odean (2001), Weber et al. (2002)). However, there is no consensus on gender-
based differences in risk aversion in the broader corporate setting (Schubert et al. (1999)). It is 
possible that females that have shattered the proverbial glass ceiling to become CEOs are equally at 
ease as their male counterparts in taking risks (Faccio et al. (2014), Adams and Funk (2012)).1 
However, existing work makes contradicting claims as to whether female CEOs are more risk averse 
than male CEOs. For instance, Huang and Kisgen (2013) find that female CEOs have lower 
leverage, raise debt less frequently, and make fewer acquisitions, but conclude that this is not due to 
                                                 
1 Not all female executives agree (see “Sheryl Sandberg’s greatest career lesson,” by P. Sellers, Fortune; 10/28/2011). 
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greater risk aversion.2 On the other hand, Faccio et al. (2014) attribute lower leverage and other 
lower-risk policies to female risk aversion. 
Although in the classical frictionless setting neither the individual manager nor her risk 
preference would matter much to shareholder value, in reality whether female CEOs are relatively 
more risk averse is important because managerial risk aversion may be value decreasing for 
diversified investors (Easterbrook (1984), Smith and Stulz (1985)). Moreover, a nascent literature 
finds that risk aversion (Graham et al. (2010)) and, more generally, managerial traits (see below) are 
important determinants of firm decision making and, hence, firm outcomes. Since gender is 
persistent, thus inducing greater behavioral consistency, it is important to determine whether or not 
female CEOs are more risk averse.    
The objective of this study is to examine whether there are differences in the risk aversion of 
male and female CEOs. One challenge with pursuing this line of enquiry is that we do not directly 
observe managerial risk aversion and, as such, require a proxy. I am guided by the practice of 
benchmarking managerial risk aversion by the level of their firms’ cash holdings (Chava and 
Purnanandam (2010), Dittmar and Duchin (2013)). However, I extend this practice by considering 
not only how much cash is held, but also the pace at which cash is accumulated and how excess cash 
is deployed. Jointly, these are of fundamental importance to understanding managerial risk aversion 
and are likely to be more informative about risk aversion relative to examining only cash holdings.  
As Harford et al. (2008) note, the decision regarding the use of cash is of utmost importance 
to managers. One reason for this is that alternate uses of cash impose differing levels of risk on the 
firm. Therefore, managers’ predilection for deploying cash in a particular manner is likely to reflect 
their risk preferences. For instance, risk averse CEOs may prefer to pay dividends with excess cash 
as they believe it reduces firm risk (Brav et al. (2005)), consistent with the evidence that firms that 
                                                 
2 Huang and Kisgen (2013) draw inferences from a sample of CEOs and CFOs covering the time period from 1993 to 
2005. However, I focus on CEOs during the period 1992 to 2013. See Table 1 for changes in the sample over time. 
 3 
 
increase their dividends experience a reduction in systematic risk (Grullon et al. (2002)). Moreover, 
gender-based differences in the use of excess cash can reveal whether the observed lower leverage of 
female-led firms (Huang and Kisgen (2013), Faccio et al. (2014)) is a derivative of, or if the lower 
incidence of debt issuance is complemented by, a more aggressive debt repayment policy using 
excess cash.3 Similarly, how quickly CEOs accumulate cash when there is a significant cash deficit 
relative to a target level is arguably a more precise signal of managerial risk aversion than their cash 
holdings because even less risk averse firms can occasionally have large cash holdings if they are 
profitable, whereas quickly reversing a cash deficit typically requires managerial proactivity. Gender 
differences in these aspects of firms’ management of their cash are not dependent on observing 
gender differences in cash holdings and so examining them is insightful in their own right.4  
I focus on the CEO since Chava and Purnanandam (2010) find evidence that CEOs, not 
CFOs, drive firms’ cash holdings. More generally, it is CEOs’ preferences that shape firm policies 
and set the tone for other executives, consistent with the “upper echelons” view of firm behavior 
(Hambrick (2005), Chaterjee and Hambrick (2007)). 
I find that female-led firms have about 18% greater cash holdings than male-led firms. This 
result is robust to various specifications that account for the usual motives for holding cash, firm 
characteristics that capture the stage of firms’ lifecycle, other CEO characteristics that influence risk-
taking, firm governance, and industry and year fixed effects. It also holds when I use only the 
physical cash component of cash holdings. Given that female CEOs have easier access to external 
                                                 
3 There is no simple connection between the speed of adjustment of leverage and that of cash, as could be induced by 
adjustment costs (Dittmar and Duchin (2011)). Hence, I cannot infer this aspect of female CEOs’ cash policy from 
observing their debt policy. 
4 As discussed below, jointly assessing the speed of adjustment of surplus cash to target levels and how excess cash is 
deployed can assist in reconciling the higher agency cost implied by the greater cash holdings of female CEOs (Adhikari 
(2012)) with the presumption that female-led firms are better governed (assuming females’ contribution to improved 
governance (Adams and Ferreira (2009), Dezsö and Ross (2012)) is transferred to operations when they become CEOs). 
Simply observing cash holdings could lead to incorrect inferences on this issue. 
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capital (Faccio et al. (2014), Francis et al. (2013)) and, as such, should have less precautionary cash 
demand, the results suggest that female CEOs are more risk averse than male CEOs. 
My results may be driven by endogeneity. For instance, socioeconomic circumstances could 
favor the selection of a female CEO at the same time that the firm’s cash level is high. Similarly, 
female executives could choose to become CEOs of cash-rich firms. I utilize identification strategies 
that are standard in this literature (Gao, Harford, and Li (2013), Huang and Kisgen (2013)) to 
address these concerns. Primarily, I use a propensity-score matched sample of female- and male-led 
firms and difference-in-differences tests between firms that transition from a male CEO to a female 
CEO and a control group of male-to-male transitions. Moreover, several controls, such as firm and 
CEO age and firm governance, potentially affect both cash policy and CEO selection and, as such, 
mitigate this concern. My results remain qualitatively the same. 
I also find that female CEOs have significantly greater speed of adjustment (SOA) of cash 
from cash deficit to target levels, taking 1.69 years to cover half the deficit compared to 2.83 years 
for male-led firms. In contrast, for cash surpluses, female and male CEOs have similar SOAs. 
My results also indicate that female-led firms have approximately 6.6% higher probability 
than male-led firms of increasing dividend payout with excess cash. In contrast, there is no gender-
based difference in the probability of increasing capital investment, debt repayment, or repurchases. 
Further analysis indicates that, for a given dividend payout ratio as male-led firms, female-led firms 
hold significantly more cash. Thus, higher dividend payout appears to be a motive for female CEOs 
to hoard cash, but it does not fully explain this phenomenon.5 Collectively, the above results indicate 
that female CEOs are more risk averse than their male counterparts. 
                                                 
5 My results also suggest that despite the greater cash holdings of female CEOs it does not appear that female-led firms 
have greater agency problems than male-led firms because there would likely be a lower (greater) probability of 
increasing dividends (acquisitions) with the excess cash (and that would result in a faster SOA of cash when there is a 
cash surplus, Harford et al. (2008), Gao et al. (2013)). Moreover, if rebalancing is efficient, then the faster SOA when 
there is a cash deficit suggests that female firms may be better governed (Dittmar and Duchin (2011)). 
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I also examine how investors perceive the marginal value of the cash holdings of female 
CEOs, thus providing alternative evidence on the economic consequences of risk aversion. Female 
CEO risk aversion may hurt investors and, accordingly, negatively affect the marginal value of cash 
held by female CEOs. On the other hand, cash is positively associated with firm performance. In 
deciding on the relative marginal values of cash investors should consider the tradeoff between the 
tendency of greater cash holdings and dividend payout to lower the marginal value of cash and the 
positive effect of lower leverage on the marginal value of cash (Faulkender and Wang (2006)). 
Therefore, this is an empirical question. I find that a dollar of excess cash in female-led firms is 
valued at approximately 39 cents more than in a male-led firm. This result, perhaps, reflect the 
positive correlation between cash and firm performance (Mikkelson and Partch (2003), Fresard 
(2010), Garcia-Appendini and Montoriol-Garriga (2013)). Coupled with the result that there is a 
greater probability that female CEOs in possession of excess cash will increase dividends, this result 
suggests that there is a “dividend clientele” with a strong preference for female-led firms and they 
react positively to cash build-up, anticipating increases in dividend rather than in R&D or 
acquisitions which might not increase shareholder value.6 
My paper contributes to two literatures. First, it contributes to the growing literature on the 
effects of managerial traits on corporate policy (Bertrand and Schoar (2003), Malmendier and Tate 
(2005, 2008), Malmendier et al. (2011), Cronqvist et al. (2012), Dittmar and Duchin (2013), Graham 
et al. (2013), Hutton et al. (2013), Cain and McKeon (2014)). Adhikari (2012), Huang and Kisgen 
(2013), and Faccio et al. (2014) also study CEO gender. My paper complements, but is distinct from, 
theirs. They examine gender-based differences in corporate policies and then infer gender-based 
differences in risk aversion. In contrast, I show that female CEOs are more risk averse than male 
CEOs, thus providing a possible reason for these policy differences. As such, I add to the extant 
                                                 
6 Investors can now invest in an index of female-led firms (http://www.learnvest.com/2012/12/new-index-tracks-
stocks-of-companies-run-by-female-ceos/). 
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discourse regarding whether even those females that have displayed the fortitude to ascend to the 
top rung of the corporate ladder retain the greater risk aversion that characterizes females in general. 
An implication of this is that investors will need to be extra vigilant that the greater risk aversion of 
female CEOs does not cause underinvestment in profitable, albeit riskier, projects, thus hurting 
investors.    
Second, I contribute to the cash literature by being the first to document that male and 
female CEOs have different preferences for how they deploy excess cash. This is important since 
the way cash is deployed is likely to be more value-relevant than the cash holdings themselves. 
Further, I deepen our understanding of the lower leverage of female-led firms by showing that it is 
not accompanied by, and therefore not likely a derivative of, speedier debt repayment using excess 
cash. This underscores the stronger tendency of female CEOs for using excess cash to increase 
payout. Finally, while cash holdings are central to shareholder wealth maximization (Myers and 
Majluf (1984)), I show that the impact of cash on investors’ wealth is a function of CEO gender.   
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II develops the hypotheses. Section III 
describes the data and Section IV presents the empirical results. Section V concludes. 
 
Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 
CEO gender, risk-taking, and firm cash holdings  
To date, research relating CEO gender to corporate decisions and/or outcomes is in its 
nascent stage. Adhikari (2012), using U.S. data, finds that firms led by female CEOs have higher 
cash holdings and lower leverage, risk, and operating performance than male-led firms. Faccio et al. 
(2014) provide multi-country evidence that firms led by female CEOs have lower leverage, less 
volatile earnings, and a higher survival rate than male-led firms. Both the above papers attribute their 
findings to female risk-avoidance. However, although Huang and Kisgen (2013) find that female 
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executives make fewer acquisitions and issue debt less frequently than male executives, they do not 
attribute this to female risk-avoidance since they find no difference in cash holdings between firms 
led by male and female executives (CEOs and/or CFOs). There is, however, ample evidence that 
managerial risk aversion affects corporate policy. Graham et al. (2013) find that CEOs’ risk-
avoidance influences corporate financial policies. Dittmar and Duchin (2013) find that firms led by 
CEOs who previously worked at firms that experienced financial difficulties hold more cash, less 
short-term debt, and have lower debt ratio, due to lower risk preferences.  
The literature notes that the major reasons for holding cash are transaction (Baumol (1952), 
Miller and Orr (1966)), precautionary (Opler et al. (1999), Almeida, Campello, and Weisbach (2004), 
Acharya, Almeida, and Campello (2007)), monitoring (Gao, Harford, and Li (2013)), and agency 
(Jensen (1986), Dittmar et al. (2003), Harford et al. (2008)) motives. If excess cash holdings mitigate 
risk, such as financial constraints risk (Whited (2006)), then more risk averse CEOs are expected to 
hold more cash. Hence, if female CEOs are more risk averse than male CEOs I expect them to hold 
more cash than male CEOs, after controlling for the determinants of cash holdings.   
Speed of adjustment of cash 
Prior studies find that firms attempt to maintain optimal levels of cash (Opler et al. (1999)). 
If female CEOs generally hold more cash than male CEOs and if this is motivated by greater risk 
aversion on the part of female CEOs, then an additional action by female CEOs that would also be 
consistent with greater risk aversion is that female CEOs would revert to optimal cash levels more 
quickly once cash levels have fallen from the optimal. Hence, the speed of adjustment (SOA) of cash 
can shed light on whether female CEOs are more risk averse. This is based on the argument that 
female-led firms have easier access to external capital and are less likely to be financially constrained 
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than male-led firms.7 Assume that the transactions and opportunity costs of reverting to optimal 
cash levels from any given point below the optimal are the same for both male- and female-led 
firms.8 The above implies that female-led firms should be less inclined to rapidly revert to the 
optimal level of cash. In other words, if there is a greater SOA by female-led firms, it is highly likely 
to be driven by higher levels of female CEOs’ risk aversion.   
CEO risk aversion and the use of excess cash  
Cash facilitates investments in risky activities, such as research and development (R&D) and 
mergers and acquisitions (M&A). R&D projects are long term in nature, with a high probability of 
failure (Holmstrom (1989)) and M&As do not necessarily increase shareholder value (Andrade et al. 
(2001)). Moreover, stockholders pressure public firms to make short-term investments by 
underinvesting in these risky projects (Stein (1989), Bushee (1998), Bhojraj et al. (2009)). The extent 
to which firms engage in these activities is a function of firm characteristics and CEO risk 
preferences (Faccio et al. (2014), Dittmar and Duchin (2013)).  
As noted by Easterbrook (1984), managerial risk-avoidance is one of the sources of agency 
costs. Managers, acting as agents for shareholders, have a substantial component of their personal 
wealth tied to the fortunes of their firms. Hence, managers may seek to reduce their risk by avoiding 
risky capital investment. If CEO risk-avoidance is a dominant trait and female CEOs are more risk 
averse than male CEOs, then there is a lower probability that female-led firms will increase capital 
investment even when in possession of excess cash. 
However, financial market response is generally favorable to risky capital investment if the 
firm is suited for it, as reflected by the exhibition of certain relevant characteristics (McConnell and 
                                                 
7 Faccio et al. (2014) suggest that firms led by female CEOs have easier access to external financing due to lower 
information asymmetry. Francis, Hasan, and Wu (2013) find that firms with female CFOs are less financially constrained 
and pay lower cost of bank debt.  
8 Transactions costs are related to raising external cash (but not the cost of capital per se) and opportunity costs are 
those arising from hoarding cash rather than deploying current cash or cash flows to alternate uses such as investment, 
repaying debt, and increasing productivity-based compensation which could increase firm value. 
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Muscarella (1985), Chan et al. (1990)). Assuming that relatively greater ability to finance risky capital 
investment is one such relevant characteristic, this suggests that the availability of excess cash could 
lead to an increase in capital investment by female-led firms. Moreover, access to cheaper capital 
should further facilitate capital investment. Hence, I could observe that female-led firms have a 
higher probability of increasing capital investment when in possession of excess cash, making this an 
empirical question. 
Excess cash can also be used to increase payout by way of dividends or repurchases. 
Dividends are valuable signals and a form of wealth redistribution to shareholders (Bhattacharya 
(1979), Grinblatt et al. (1984), Miller and Rock (1985), Banker et al. (1993)). CEOs can also use 
dividend smoothing to signal future growth opportunities. Since using excess cash to make payouts 
is a relatively safe option for CEOs, more risk-averse CEOs should be more inclined to pursue this 
option. An alternative to dividend payout would be share repurchases. Therefore, I expect that the 
probability of an increase in payout (dividend or repurchases) is higher for female-led firms.  
Cash-rich firms can change leverage towards target levels by choosing to repay debt 
(Faulkender et al. (2012)). They might choose to do so if the CEO wishes to develop financial slack 
or increase profitability, given that leverage is negatively related to profitability (Bradley, Jarrell, and 
Kim (1984), Harris and Raviv (1991), Rajan and Zingales (1995)). Given that reducing leverage 
reduces firm risk, if female CEOs are more risk averse, then I expect that female-led firms have 
higher probability of increasing the rate at which they pay down debt.  
Marginal value of cash and CEO gender 
If female-led firms hold more cash than male-led firms because of greater risk aversion, then 
a complementary empirical question is how investors perceive the cash held by female-led firms 
relative to that held by male-led firms. On the one hand, cash accumulation might be favorably 
perceived by the market, given that large cash balances improve operating performance (Mikkelson 
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and Partch (2003)), especially in periods of financial constraints (Garcia-Appendini and Montoriol-
Garriga (2013)). Boyle and Guthrie (2003) suggest that financing constraints may cause firms to 
sacrifice a significant proportion of a project’s value thereby reducing firm value. Campello, 
Graham, and Harvey (2010) find that financially constrained firms cut their investments more 
compared to firms that are less constrained. Further, cash policy is a significant strategic dimension 
of firm operations (Fresard (2010)). Moreover, there might be a clientele effect (DeAngelo, 
DeAngelo, and Skinner (2004)), whereby investors have a preference for female-led firms on the 
assumption that they will pay higher dividends.  
On the other hand, as previously noted, managerial risk-avoidance is a source of agency 
costs (Easterbrook (1984)) and excess cash is usually associated with higher levels of agency conflicts 
(Harford, Mansi, and Maxwell (2008)). Furthermore, if excess cash is used to pay off debt, then the 
firm reduces the disciplinary mechanism of debt (Jensen (1986)).  
 
Data Description and Summary Statistics 
To execute my tests I require three sets of data. First, I need CEOs’ gender. This is obtained 
from the Execucomp database. Using this data I define a dummy variable, Female, as one if the CEO 
is female in a particular year, and zero otherwise. All data in Execucomp are collected from 
companies’ proxy statements. Because the Execucomp database starts in 1992, my sample period is 
from 1992 to 2013. Further, it restricts my sample to the largest 1,500 public U.S. firms. Second, I 
require stock return data, which are obtained from the Center for Research in Security Prices 
(CRSP). Third, I require firm-level financial information. I use Compustat fundamental annual 
database to construct my sample. As is common, financial firms (SIC 6000-6999) and utilities (SIC 
4900-4999) are excluded from my sample. My primary variable from this source is the measure of 
Cash Holdings. This is the ratio of cash and marketable securities to book value of assets (CHE/AT). 
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This is the standard measure used in several previous studies (Opler et al. (1999), Bates et al. (2009)). 
Given that, for the most part, the other variables are standard in many papers I describe them in 
detail in the data Appendix A.  I winsorized all continuous variables at the 1% and 99% levels. All 
dollar values are in 2002 dollars. 
Table 1 reports the distribution of female-led firms in my sample over time and across 
industries. Panel A indicates that there has been steady growth in the number of female CEOs of 
large public firms in the United States, especially since the late 1990s. Nonetheless, even at their 
peak in 2010, they still constitute only about 3% of CEOs in the top 1,500 public firms. The 
evidence in Panel B indicates that females have been CEOs in about two-thirds of the 48 Fama-
French industries. However, they have served a greater number of firm-years in industries such as 
retail (133), business services (118), and pharmaceutical products (46).  
To provide a backdrop for my study, Figure 1 graphs the change in cash holdings for 20 firms 
that had a transition from male to female CEO during my sample period. These are the firms that 
had the largest change in average cash holdings from the last two years of a male CEO to the first 
two years of the female CEO, excluding the transition year. The evidence indicates that for many 
firms the change in cash holdings is quite large. On average there is a 6% increase in cash ratio, from 
17% to 18%, across all male-to-female transition firms. 
Table 2 provides summary statistics of the variables used in my tests. I split my sample into 
firms that are led by male (Female = 0) and female (Female = 1) CEOs. The unconditional evidence in 
the first row indicates that the cash holdings of female-led firms are substantially more than that of 
male-led firms. The mean (median) cash holdings is 19% (15%) for firms led by female CEOs, 
whereas the mean (median) cash holdings is 15% (8%) for firms led by male CEOs, a difference of 
about 27%. The Wilcoxon rank-sum test rejects the null hypothesis that cash holdings are the same 
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for both types of firms at the 1% level. I also find that the (unreported) correlation between the 
gender dummy, Female, and cash holdings is positive and significant, supporting the above finding. 
I also observe notable differences in means (and/or medians) between firms with male CEOs 
and firms with female CEOs for almost all variables. Firms led by female CEOs tend to be smaller 
and to invest less in R&D, acquisitions, and capital expenditures. It is not surprising to find that 
firms led by female CEOs also have lower market-to-book ratio as this variable captures long-term 
effects of current investments. 
There is no difference in the proportion of male- and female-led firms paying dividends (Payout). 
Also, firms with female CEOs have significantly lower leverage and lower financial constraints 
(significantly different values for the KZ Index) compared to firms led by male CEOs. This suggests 
that female CEOs have a preference for financial slack (by having lower leverage and greater cash 
holdings) even though they appear to be less financially constrained. 
 
Empirical Results 
Do female CEOs hold more cash?  
I use the model in Bates, Kahle, and Stulz (2009) to study the normal levels of cash holdings 
by firms. The model accounts for the various motives to hold cash that have been analyzed in the 
literature. In order to examine the effect of female CEOs I use the gender dummy, Female, in the 
model for cash. Thus, the modified cash holdings equation with which I begin my study is: 
                      Cash holdings
it
 = β
0
 + β
1
Femaleit + β2MBit + β3Sizeit + β4CFit + β5R&Dit  
   + β
6
Capex
it
 +β
7
NWCit + β8Leverageit + β9Payoutit + β10ACQit 
                                 +  β
11
CFvolatility
it
 + β
12
Firm age
it
 + Industry FE
i
 + Year FEt + εit. (1)  
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This general specification is also used by Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007), Harford, Mansi, 
and Maxwell (2008), Gao, Harford, and Li (2013), and others. The above is a panel model with 
industry and year fixed effects to account for potential unobservable time-invariant industry-specific 
and year-specific effects that may be correlated with cash holdings. I also estimate other variants of 
the model using different techniques. In general throughout the paper, where appropriate, t-statistics 
are estimated with heteroskedasticity-adjusted standard errors.  
The results are reported in Table 3. In Model 1, which represents equation (1), I find that 
Female is positive and statistically significant. Therefore, in support of the finding from the summary 
statistics, cash holdings at female-led firms are significantly larger than at male-led firms, after 
conditioning on the general reasons for holding cash. As CEO characteristics other than gender 
influence the level of firms’ cash holdings (Bertrand and Schoar (2003), Malmendier, Tate, and Yan 
(2011), Huang and Kisgen (2013), Dittmar and Duchin (2013)), in Model 2 I control for several 
CEO characteristics. Specifically, I augment equation (1) with CEOs’ age, tenure at the firm, and 
stock ownership percentage in the firm. CEOs’ age is likely to capture certain life experiences, such 
as periods of war and economic depression, or job market experiences, that could influence 
disposition towards corporate liquidity. Likewise, tenure and stock ownership could affect the level 
of job-specific risk of the CEO or the extent of managerial overconfidence and, therefore, CEOs’ 
desire to hoard cash. I am effectively assuming that gender reflects a disposition towards holding 
cash that is over and above the influences of these characteristics. The results indicate that even after 
controlling for CEO characteristics, Female remains positive and highly significant.  
Although I include control variables (payout, leverage) in my model to address the agency 
motive for holding cash, I estimate an additional model in which I control for institutional investor 
ownership as a proxy for corporate governance (see Chen, Harford, and Li (2007) and references 
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therein). This controls for any remaining agency-related motives for holding excess cash. The results 
are reported in Model 3. The results continue to hold.  
I also report two other models. In Model 4, I employ the Fama-MacBeth approach to 
correct for possible cross-sectional dependence in residuals, which biases the results in my favor if 
left untreated. I also account for unobserved heterogeneity among CEOs. Given my interest in 
assessing the effect of gender, which is a time-invariant variable that would be perfectly correlated 
with time-invariant (unobserved) firm fixed effects, I use a panel random effects estimator (Model 
5). Using both above approaches, I continue to find that firms with female CEOs have significantly 
greater cash holdings. 
Across the five specifications the average coefficient estimate on Female is 0.027. This implies 
that female CEOs hold cash that is 2.7% of book assets more than that of male CEOs. Stated 
differently, after accounting for various reasons posited in the literature for firms to hold cash, I find 
that female CEOs hold approximately 18% more cash than male CEOs.9  
The signs of the control variables are consistent with my expectations and prior literature. 
Cash holdings increase with market-to-book, which reflects greater growth in firms’ revenues. It also 
increases with R&D and is greater in industries with higher cash flow volatility. Also, the evidence 
suggests that cash holdings depend on the stage of the firm’s lifecycle as younger firms tend to hold 
more cash than older firms. The evidence also indicates that cash holdings decline with firm size as 
the precautionary motive to save cash is less for large firms. Capital expenditure, net working capital, 
leverage, dividend payments, and acquisitions also tend to reduce cash reserves.  
Identification strategy  
Despite the above tests, as previously noted, the link between cash holdings and CEO 
gender may be spurious on account of endogeneity. To address this possibility I use different 
                                                 
9 This is 0.027/0.15, the ratio of the coefficient estimate over the mean cash holdings ratio of the entire sample of firms. 
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approaches. First, I use a propensity score-matching approach to address potential self-selection. My 
aim is to obtain a control group (male-led firms) whose members have the same propensity to 
belong to the treatment group (female-led firms). The matching is executed using a logit regression 
(choice model) of the female CEO dummy variable on firm size and leverage, as well as industry and 
year fixed effects.10 I then use the propensity scores obtained from the logit regression and perform 
a one-to-one nearest neighbor match without replacement to select firms with male CEOs. Finally, I 
estimate the outcome regression for female-led and matched male-led firms’ cash holdings on the 
variables in equation (1). Hence, my inferences about relative cash holdings are on the basis of 
multivariate models, not univariate differences, after matching. 
The results for the outcome model of the propensity score matching approach are reported 
in Table 4, Models 1 and 2. As before, the dependent variable is firms’ cash holdings. I estimate two 
specifications–Model 1 is an industry and year fixed effects regression and Model 2 uses the Fama-
MacBeth technique. In both specifications I find that the gender dummy is positive and statistically 
significant, indicating greater cash holdings by firms with female CEOs. Moreover, the coefficient 
estimate is within the same range as previously observed.  
I also use difference-in-differences to determine whether there is a causal relation between 
higher cash holdings and female CEOs. In this approach, I compare firms with a male-to-female 
CEO transition against a sample of firms with a male-to-male CEO transition. Hence, I exclude 
firms with no transition or other transitions than the above. To execute the difference-in-differences 
I require that each ﬁrm has two years of data before and two years of data after an executive 
transition, excluding the year of the transition. This approach reduces the probability that the results 
are biased by issues such as a new CEO delaying policy changes such that the early effects reflect the 
policy of the pre-transition manager (Huang and Kisgen (2013)). The main model is: 
                                                 
10 These characteristics are among the most common and robust distinguishing features between male- and female-led 
firms (Adhikari (2012), Faccio et al. (2014), and Graham et al. (2013), Huang and Kisgen (2013)). 
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           Cash holdings
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 + εit.                                  (2) 
The coefficient estimate of interest is that on the interaction term between Female (which, given my 
sample, now represents firms that had a transition from being male- to female-led) and the 
post_transition variable (indicating the period after executive transition), Female×post_transition. A 
positive and significant value for β3 indicates that firms experience an increase in cash holdings after 
a male-to-female CEO transition as compared to a male-to-male CEO transition.  
The results are in Table 4, Models 3 to 5. I estimate three specifications of this model. In the 
first specification I estimate the usual difference-in-differences model as above. In addition, 
following Huang and Kisgen (2013), in a second specification I exclude the standalone Female. In a 
third specification I also exclude the standalone Female variable, but I include firm fixed effects. In 
these specifications I vary the inclusion of year fixed effects. The year fixed effects address the fact 
that CEO transitions occur at different times in my sample. I find that the coefficient estimate on 
Female×post_transition is positive and significant in all specifications. This indicates that female CEOs 
increase firms’ cash holdings more as compared to male CEOs after becoming CEO. The 
magnitude of the coefficient estimates on the interaction terms declines from Model 3 to Model 5, 
suggesting that there are some firm fixed effects that are correlated with the female dummy, but the 
latter is important on its own. The results also suggest that there are changes over time that have 
increased the cash holdings of all firms (Bates et al. (2009)) as the inclusion of the year fixed effects 
reduces the impact of female CEOs on cash holdings, but the female CEO effect is separate and 
independent of this effect.  
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Collectively, the evidence in this section is consistent with the view that the higher cash holdings 
of female CEOs is causal; that is, on average, when female CEOs take over the reign of a 
corporation they significantly increase the firms’ cash holdings.   
CEO gender and speed of adjustment of cash  
To examine whether female CEOs have a greater speed of adjustment to target cash levels 
than male CEOs when they have a cash deficit I use the following partial adjustment model:  
     ∆Cash holdings
it
 = β
0
+β
1
Femaleit+ β2(cashit
*-cashit-1)+β3Femaleit×(cashit
*-cashit-1)+εit.  (3) 
In equation (3) the dependent variable is the change in cash holdings over the financial year. The 
independent variable cash* is the expected or target cash holdings, which is estimated as follows for 
each firm. Using only the propensity score-matched sample of female- and male-led firms, I re-
estimate the cash holdings regression in equation (1). I then use the coefficient estimates from this 
model to calculate expected cash levels for male-led firms from the fitted model. I also calculate 
expected cash levels for female-led firms by fitting the coefficient estimates of the cash holdings 
regression to the data for female-led firms. This process not only helps to reduce any bias in cash 
holdings arising due to firm characteristics, but also gives the level of cash a female-led firm should 
hold in the absence of any risk-avoidance behavior by the female CEO. Thus cashit
*-cashit-1 measures 
the deviation of a firm’s cash holdings from its target level of cash holdings, so that a positive value 
reflects a cash deficit. The coefficient β2 captures the SOA of male-led firms, while β3 captures the 
increment in the SOA for female-led firms relative to male-led firms. 
The results are reported in Table 5. I use the full sample in Model 1, whereas I use the top 
and bottom quartiles of deviations in cash holdings in Model 2 and Model 3, respectively. Higher 
values of deviation (top quartile) would indicate a greater deficit from the expected cash levels, 
whereas lower values of deviation (bottom quartile) would indicate presence of excess cash as 
compared to the expected cash levels. For the full sample the positive, but insignificant value of β3 
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indicates that female CEOs have a similar SOA as male CEOs. However, when there is a deficit in 
cash holdings (expected cash holdings are greater than actual; Model 2), female CEOs adjust their 
cash levels upward to the target at a significantly higher speed than male CEOs, as indicated by the 
positive and highly significant coefficient estimate, β3. Specifically, while male CEOs close about 
22% of the deficit each year, on average, female CEOs close about 34%. Stated differently, the 
average female CEO takes 1.69 years to close half the deficit (half-life of the deficit) , compared to 
2.83 years for the average male CEO (see, e.g., Dittmar and Duchin (2011)).11 When there is surplus 
cash there is no significant difference in speeds of adjustment between male- and female-led firms. 
The result that female CEOs adjust cash holdings to target levels at a much faster rate than 
male CEOs suggests that female CEOs have a stronger preference for excess cash than male CEOs.  
How do female CEOs use excess cash?  
I examine if female-led firms utilize their excess cash differently from male-led firms by 
using a subsample of firms with excess cash in the top quartile of excess cash. Excess cash is the 
difference between the actual cash levels of the firm in a given year and the expected cash level for 
the firm in that year. To estimate the expected cash levels I use the same approach as described in 
the speed of adjustment estimation in the previous subsection. 
For each firm-year I determine if a firm has increased its dividends (paying), in which case it is 
labeled as 1, and 0 if it has not. I then estimate a logit model to examine whether CEO gender 
affects the probability that a firm with excess cash in the top quartile of excess cash increases its 
dividend payout. I do the same for debt repayment (repaying), investment in R&D, capital 
expenditure, and acquisitions (investing), and repurchases (repurchasing) to determine if CEO gender 
affects the probability that firms with excess cash increase their repayment of debt, investment, or 
repurchases. I follow Gao et al. (2013) and use appropriate controls in the regressions.  
                                                 
11 The half-life is computed as log(0.5)/log(1-SOA) for the first-order autoregressive model of cash holdings. 
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The results are reported in Table 6. I find that the probability that firms with excess cash 
increase their dividend payout is higher for firms with female CEOs than for firms with male CEOs 
(Model 1). In particular, there is a 6.6% higher probability that female-led firms increase dividend 
payout when in possession of excess cash. There is no evidence to suggest that being a female-led 
firm has a significant incremental effect on the probability of increasing investment, increasing debt 
repayment, or increasing repurchases with excess cash. These results indicate that female CEOs are 
more likely to pay out excess cash as dividends rather than invest, reduce debt, or repurchase shares.  
Given the above evidence, it may be inferred that female CEOs hold more cash because 
they pay out more dividends to shareholders than male CEOs. If I fix the payout ratio for male- and 
female-led firms and continue to find that female-led firms still hold more cash than male-led firms, 
then I cannot attribute the excess cash held by female CEOs solely to higher dividends. Instead, it 
would lend support to the idea that female CEOs are relatively more risk averse. I examine this in 
two ways. I re-estimate equation (1) augmented with the interaction Female×Payout. In untabulated 
results, I find that the coefficient estimate on Female×Payout is positive and significant (coeff = 0.03, 
SE = 0.002). This indicates that, among firms that pay dividends, female-led firms hold cash that is 
4.4% of book assets more than male-led firms. In my second approach, I create a propensity score-
matched sample of male- and female-led firms, where I match on dividend payout ratio 
(dividends/book assets) and industry and year, and test for difference in mean cash holdings. In 
untabulated results, I find that the mean (median) cash holdings for female-led firms is 18% (14%) 
of book assets, which is significantly different from that for male-led firms, 13% (8%). These results 
imply that, for the same dividend payout ratio as male CEOs, female CEOs hold significantly more 
cash in proportion to total assets. Hence, female CEOs hold excess cash not solely because they are 
more likely to pay out higher dividends in cash. I attribute the excess cash to female CEOs’ greater 
risk aversion, at least in part. 
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CEO gender and the marginal value of cash  
In this subsection I examine whether investors value the excess cash held by female CEOs 
differently from that held by male CEOs. My result that female CEOs have a greater tendency to 
increase dividend payout rather than to increase investment in risky projects or accelerate debt 
repayment could mean that investors regard cash held by female CEOs more favorably. That is, 
dividend payout in the absence of profitable investment opportunities is considered as a positive 
signal by shareholders (Fama and French (2001)).12 However, in a study of privately held and 
publicly traded European companies, Faccio et al. (2014) find that investment policies by female 
CEOs destroy value for shareholders as they forego profitable investment opportunities that have 
high risk. Thus, it is an empirical question how the market responds to the tendency of female 
CEOs to hold more cash than male CEOs.  
To address the above, I examine how investors respond to changes in cash over a firm’s 
fiscal year. Shareholders should react to changes in cash either positively or negatively depending 
upon whether they perceive the changes to be value creating or value destroying. I estimate the 
following Faulkender and Wang (2006) model augmented with the gender dummy, Female, and its 
interaction with changes in cash holdings: 
                              Rit
E=α+β
1
Female+β
2
∆cash holdings
it
MVit-1
+β
3
Female×
∆cash holdings
it
MVit-1
+XB+eit.          (4) 
The dependent variable 𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝐸  is the excess stock return for firm i in fiscal year t over stock i’s 
benchmark return (RBi,t) for fiscal year t (Rit-RBit). The coefficient estimate on Female×Δcash 
holdingsi,t/MVi,t-1  measures the incremental marginal value of cash attributable to a female CEO. The 
sign and significance of the coefficient estimate indicates whether shareholders perceive changes in 
cash holdings by female CEOs positively or negatively. The vector X contains Δearnings, Δnet assets, 
                                                 
12 Payout decisions tend to reduce agency conflicts and serve as a corporate governance mechanism (Jensen (1993)). The 
higher probability that female CEOs increase dividend payout may reduce potential agency problems and improve 
governance, such that the excess cash held by female-led firms have a greater positive effect on firm value. 
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ΔR&D, Δinterest expenses, Δdividends, and lagged cash holdings, all scaled by lagged market value 
(MV), plus leverage and new financing. ΔX indicates an unexpected change in variable X from fiscal 
year t–1 to year t which, following Faulkender and Wang (2006), I approximate with the actual 
change. Finally, I include the interactions between lagged scaled cash holdings and Δcash holdings as 
well as leverage and Δcash holdings as in Faulkender and Wang (2006), although my results hold 
without them. To calculate excess stock returns I need benchmark returns (RBit). I use the value-
weighted returns on the 25 Fama-French size and book-to-market portfolios to which the firms 
belong. The size and book-to-market classification is done at the beginning of the fiscal year.  
The results are presented in Table 7. Model 1 is estimated without my variable of main 
interest to ensure that this specification is reasonable for my data. The results are largely consistent 
with Faulkender and Wang (2006). They indicate that shareholders respond positively to growth in 
cash holdings. Likewise, they respond positively to earnings growth and higher dividend payments. 
On the other hand, shareholders respond negatively to increases in interest expenses and leverage.  
In Model 2 I introduce the female CEO dummy variable, Female, as a standalone variable. I 
find that the coefficient estimate on Female is negative and significant, indicating that firms with 
female CEOs, on average, have lower excess returns than firms with male CEOs. In Model 3 the 
variable of interest is Female ×Δcash holdingsi,t/MVi,t-1. The coefficient estimate on this variable is 
positive and significant, implying that shareholders perceive that an increase in cash held by female 
CEOs has an incremental effect on their wealth relative to an increase in cash held by male CEOs. 
Specifically, the evidence indicates that an increase of $1 of cash held by female-led firms has $0.39 
greater marginal value than an increase of $1 by male-led firms.13 From the coefficient estimate on 
the standalone Δcash holdings variable an extra $1 of cash held by male-led firms have a marginal value 
                                                 
13 This difference appears reasonable. For instance, it is similar to the difference between financially constrained and 
unconstrained firms (Faulkender and Wang (2006)). 
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of about $0.37, while it has a marginal value of $0.76 if held by a female-led firm. I test the statistical 
significance of the marginal value of the additional dollar of cash held by female CEOs (i.e., the 
$0.76) by testing the joint significance of the sum of the coefficient estimates (𝛽2̂ + 𝛽3)̂.  I find that 
they are jointly significant with a p-value of 0.000. 
Dividend clientele theories attribute heterogeneity in firms’ dividend policies to investor 
demand as some investors prefer to hold dividend-paying stocks due to tax or behavioral reasons 
(DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Skinner (2004)). DeAngelo and DeAngelo (2006) show that a firm’s 
payout policy is not irrelevant and investment policy is not the sole determinant of value. Thus, my 
results from Table 6 (female CEOs are more likely to increase dividend payout) and Table 7 (cash 
held by female CEOs has greater marginal value) suggest that there is a “dividend clientele” that 
invests in firms led by female CEOs and, hence, they react positively to cash build-up by these firms, 
anticipating dividend payouts rather than increased investment in R&D, capital expenditures, or 
acquisitions. 
 
Conclusions 
Existing evidence suggests that female CEOs eschew corporate risk relative to male CEOs, 
as reflected in lower leverage, relative infrequency of issuing debt, and fewer acquisitions. Motivated 
by the literature that uses firms’ cash holdings to benchmark the level of managerial risk aversion, I 
comprehensively examine the relation between CEO gender and firms’ broader cash policy in order 
to address the question of whether female CEOs are more risk averse. I find that female CEOs hold 
more cash and have substantially greater speed of adjustment towards target cash levels when cash 
has fallen below their target cash levels, relative to male CEOs. My results also indicate that while 
female CEOs with excess cash have similar probability of increasing investments and debt 
repayment as male CEOs, they have a significantly larger probability of increasing their dividend 
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payout. However, among firms that pay dividends and for the same dividend payout ratio as male-
led firms, female-led firms still hold substantially more cash than male-led firms, suggesting that 
higher dividend payout is not the only reason for holding more cash. These results point strongly to 
risk aversion for female CEOs holding excess cash. Finally, I find that an extra dollar of cash held by 
female CEOs is valued more by shareholders compared to an extra dollar held by male CEOs. I 
conjecture that there is a “dividend clientele” that invests in firms led by female CEOs and that they 
react positively to cash build-up by these firms in anticipation of higher dividend payout. 
Although I comprehensively examine how corporate cash policies differ on the basis of 
CEO gender and my results suggest the existence of a dividend clientele, I do not offer any evidence 
on this, which is beyond the scope of the current paper. Future research might find it fruitful to 
examine this further. In addition, with time and a sufficiently large number of observations future 
research might obtain a clearer picture of whether female CEOs extend their preference for holding 
excess cash to an inclination for acquiring cash-rich firms, when they do engage in acquisitions. 
Likewise, future research could address the question of whether female-led firms are more likely to 
be targeted as a result of their excess cash. 
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ESSAY 2 - CEO GENDER, SHORT-TERMISM AND COMPENSATION: WHO GETS 
PAID FOR WHAT? 
 
Introduction 
The Equal Pay Act (1963) “prohibits sex-based wage discrimination between men and women in 
the same establishment who perform jobs that require substantially equal skill, effort and 
responsibility under similar working conditions.” 
 
The law, backed by social equity, demands that males and females receive equal pay for completing 
the same task. Yet there is much controversy as to whether this simple rule is being upheld by U.S. 
corporations. For a while it was widely believed that whatever gender-based wage disparity there was 
it affects only rank-and-file workers. However, as the media profiles new and existing female CEOs 
a relatively common theme is the suggestion that female CEOs are paid significantly less than their 
male counterparts. In fact, the media claims that the gender wage gap among CEOs is 69 percent, 
bigger than that among the rank and file.14 No doubt, such a claim has been fueled, in part, by the 
news that the compensation of Mary Barra, the new CEO of General Motors and the first-ever 
female CEO of a major auto company, is less than half that of her predecessor, Dan Akerson. 
Existing work relating the gender of top executives and compensation presents conflicting 
evidence. One set of studies suggests that female executives are paid less than male executives (Bell 
(2005), Jurajda and Paligorova (2009), Kulich et al. (2011), Dreher, Lee, Clerkin (2011)), while 
another finds that they are paid more (Gayle, Golan and Miller (2012), Hill, Upadhyay and Beekun 
(2014). Not surprisingly, others also find no gender disparity in compensation (Adams, Gupta, 
Haughton and Leeth (2007), Bugeja, Matolscy and Spiropoulos (2012)). This mixed evidence reflects 
                                                 
14 That is, female CEOs make $0.69 in compensation for each $1.00 made by their male counterparts. See “Want to See 
Pay Discrimination Against Women? Look at the Top.” by B. Covert, The Nation, February 5, 2014; “America’s gender 
wage gap” by The Economist Online, April 17, 2012; and “The Gender Pay Gap Is Starkest at the Bottom and the Top. 
Just Ask General Motors’ New CEO” by Nora Caplan-Bricker, The New Republic, February 6, 2014. 
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the mixed view in the media as some argue that the gender wage gap is a myth based on faulty logic 
and, hence, they argue, it is a mistake to assume that females are the victims of a sexist economy.15   
In this study, I provide new insights on this issue. I argue that despite the apparent similarity 
across firms in terms of the “responsibility” of CEOs as the leader of the firm, there is CEO 
heterogeneity regarding “skill [and] effort”. I propose that in order to determine the answer to the 
important issue of possible gender-based disparity in CEO compensation we have to condition on 
CEO “skill and effort”. Because skill and effort are not easily observed and difficult to benchmark I 
focus on corporate outcomes, which can be decomposed into short-term and long-term 
outcomes. Short-termism or corporate myopia refers to the shifting of focus from long-term 
objectives, such as innovation or R&D , in order to meet or beat short-term performance targets 
(such as increasing return on assets or sales) (Porter (1992), Chen et al. (2015)). I hypothesize that 
female CEOs achieve greater short-term performance and less long-term performance than their 
male counterparts and that this is reflected in their compensation relative to male CEOs. Hence, 
their relative compensation is dependent on the relative value placed on long- and short-term 
outcomes of the firm. 
CEOs make intertemporal choices regarding short-term and long-term performances 
(Laverty (1996)). It is generally held that short-term decisions by CEOs are less risky decisions, while 
long-term decisions are relatively more risky (Narayanan (1985)). I argue that managerial 
compensation is aligned with these short-term and long-term decisions and their outcomes. This is 
because extant literature suggests that some boards encourage CEOs to produce short-term 
outcomes in order to cater to the demands of investors (Bolton, Scheinkman, and Xiong (2006) and 
Thakor (1990)), whereas other boards allow CEOs to focus on long-term growth objectives 
(Holmstrom and Costa (1986) and (Holmstrom (1989)). In order to incentivize and motivate CEOs 
                                                 
15 See “The Gender Pay Gap is a Complete Myth,” Steve Tobak, CBS News, 3/8/2011; “Is the gender pay gap real?” 
MSN Money, 4/9/2013; and “It's Time That We End the Equal Pay Myth” by Carrie Lucas, Forbes, 4/16/2012. 
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to act in a manner consistent with these different goals, boards need to design compensation 
contracts in a way that aligns CEO characteristics and organizational goals (Hou, Priem and 
Goranova (2014)). Boards, therefore, reward CEOs for their expertise/performance in short- and 
long-term decision making with lucrative compensation contracts (Barker and Mueller (2002)). 
Recent studies have shown that personality traits of CEOs affect their corporate decisions 
and, subsequently, corporate outcomes (Bertrand and Schoar (2003), Malmendier and Tate (2005, 
2008), Malmendier, Tate and Yan (2011), Malmendier and Nagel (2011), Cain and McKeon (2012), 
Cronqvist, Makhija and Yonker (2012), Graham, Harvey and Puri (2013)). One’s gender has an 
important influence on one’s personality traits and induces a high level of behavioral consistency. 
Research in psychology and other disciplines find that females are more risk averse than males in 
general (Croson and Gneezy (2009)). One might argue that the gender difference in risk aversion 
applies to the general population only (as in most cases subjects of studies on risk preferences are 
randomly chosen), not to top corporate executives, because ascending to such top posts require 
distinct qualities that make female CEOs equally at ease in taking risk as male CEOs (Adams and 
Funk (2012)). However, Sah (2015) finds evidence that female CEOs are more risk averse than male 
CEOs and an emerging literature indicates that female CEOs tend to avoid risky corporate activities 
(Adhikari (2012), Faccio, Marchina and Mura (2014), Sah (2015)). Galasso and Simcoe (2011) find 
that overconfident CEOs are more engaged in innovation as compared to their peers. Consistent 
with these studies, female CEOs exhibit their reservations about risky activities by innovating less as 
compared to their male counterparts (Holmstrom (1989)).  
If, in fact, female CEOs are more risk averse, then economic intuition would suggest that 
they prefer less-risky short-term goals as compared to male CEOs. Upper echelon theory argues that 
top executives make decisions through their very personalized thought process influenced by their 
personal experiences, values and cognitive biases (Hambrick and Mason (1984); Hambrick, 
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Geletkanycz, and Fredrickson (1993)). Consistent with this theory, greater risk aversion of female 
CEOs should be manifested in their preference for short-term corporate actions. If they perform 
well in the fulfillment of their preferred short-term objectives relative to male CEOs, then their 
compensation should be driven by their superior ability to execute short-term goals and obtain 
favorable short-term outcomes.  
To examine the above, I proceed as follows. Following previous papers (Balkin, Markman, 
and Gomez-Mejia (2000)), I decompose CEO pay into two parts: (1) short-term compensation 
consisting of annual salary and bonus; and (2) long-term compensation consisting of equity-based 
compensation. First, I show that both short-term corporate outcomes (return on assets, ROA) and 
long-term corporate outcomes (success in innovation) of CEOs are significantly compensated. 
Second, I examine whether there are systematic differences between male and female CEOs 
in terms of both short-term and long-term corporate outcomes. I find that female CEOs have 
superior short-term, but poor long-term performance when compared to male CEOs. Specifically, 
female CEOs have about 10% greater ROA than their male counterparts, but about 24% less 
success in innovation defined as the natural log of the citation lag-adjusted measure of citation per 
patent. In accordance with the existing literature, I believe that this difference is primarily driven by 
behavioral differences in risk-taking. 
Given that long-term outcomes are generally of great importance to investors and corporate 
boards, if CEOs were compensated primarily for success in their firms’ long-term outcomes, then 
one would expect female CEOs to earn relatively less compensation. I find that, on average, after 
controlling for the usual determinants of compensations, CEO gender does not play a significant 
role in determining total CEO compensation or its short- and long-term components. This result 
supports the findings of Adams et al. (2007) and Bugeja et al. (2012).  
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However, when I condition on corporate outcomes, I find that for a given level of short-
term outcome female CEOs earn substantially more short-term compensation than male CEOs. 
This implies that boards/investors place a premium on the short-term skills that female CEOs bring 
to the firm. Short-term performance, however, does not provide any incremental long-term 
compensation for female CEOs over male CEOs. Interestingly, the evidence further indicates that 
for a given level of long-term outcome (innovation), female CEOs are compensated less than male 
CEOs in long-term, and even in short-term, compensation. This may be because boards are of the 
view that female CEOs are better suited to achieve short-term goals and compensate them 
accordingly. As before, I find no evidence of a difference in total compensation between male and 
female CEOs, conditional on either short- or long-term performance. Taken together, the above 
implies that female CEOs display relatively greater ‘skill and effort’ in the fulfillment of their firms’ 
short-term objectives. Correspondingly, their compensation is driven by their superior ability to 
execute short-term goals and obtain favorable short-term outcomes (even if they perform relatively 
poorly in achieving long-term goals) and, hence, I do not find any disparity in compensation. Stated 
differently, female CEOs are well compensated for short-termism, enough to make up for their 
relative underperformance on the firm’s long-term goals.  
To ensure the validity of my results, I address several potential issues. First, to ensure that 
my results are not driven by a particular choice of performance measures, I use alternative measures 
of long- and short-term performance and I also test those alternative measures using a larger sample 
of observations. Second, given the importance of conditioning on long- and short-term performance 
to my results, to address concerns that the effects of gender on short- and long-term corporate 
performance may be overstated in separate OLS estimation of this relationship I use Seemingly 
Unrelated Regression (SUR) models. Third, I use a propensity score-matched sample of female- and 
male-led firms to address any possible selection bias. The propensity score-matched sample is used 
 29 
 
to provide robustness to the analysis of the influence of CEO gender on compensation. Finally, I 
address the potential issue that my results are driven by endogeneity. In particular, while I posit that 
CEO performance in short- and long-term corporate activities affects CEO compensation, I 
acknowledge the possibility that compensation can affect CEOs’ effort and, hence, their 
performance. I address the possibility of endogeneity using a three-stage least squares (3SLS) model. 
My results continue to hold after addressing these concerns. 
This paper makes several contributions to the nascent literature on gender-based disparity in 
CEO compensation. First, as far as I am aware, this is the first paper within this literature to 
document that female CEOs achieve relatively greater success in firms’ short-term outcomes and 
that this affects their compensation. Second, given that this greater performance in short-term 
activities is likely related to their higher level of risk aversion, I tie my work on compensation 
differences to the well-known behavioral differences, particularly risk-taking, inherent in males and 
females and which an emerging literature shows continues above the glass ceiling (Adhikari (2012), 
Faccio et al. (2014), Sah (2015)). Third, my result that female CEOs are relatively undercompensated 
for a given level of long-term outcome suggests that the greater risk aversion of female CEOs is not 
only related to the corporate actions that female CEOs take, but also to how they are perceived by 
others, such as compensation committees of corporate boards. 
If, in fact, CEOs make intertemporal choices regarding short-term and long-term 
performances within their corporations, then one size doesn’t fit all and, hence, customization of 
compensation contracts is needed. My study could help corporate boards to design appropriate 
compensation contracts taking behavioral biases and preferences of executives into consideration.  
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 reviews the literature; Section 3 
discusses data and descriptive statistics; Section 4 provides empirical results and Section 5 concludes. 
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Relation to existing literature  
Female risk aversion 
In this study, I use gender-based differences in preference for long- and short-term firm 
performance to connect CEO gender to executive compensation. Specifically, I study the differences 
in and drivers of compensation for male and female CEOs. I argue that differences in corporate 
decisions are based on the behavioral differences, particularly attitude towards risk-taking (or risk 
avoidance), between male and female CEOs. Hence, male and female CEOs may have varying 
preferences (because of their behavioral biases) for setting corporate goals, which in turn may drive 
their compensation. 
 Risk-avoidance by females carries on even if they are in top corporate positions and that 
influences their corporate decision making and, hence, corporate outcomes. There are numerous 
studies (Bolton and Katok (1995), Blau and Kahn (1992)) which discuss risk taking behavior and 
gender. The common theme of these papers is that females are more risk averse than males. Croson 
and Gneezy (2009) provide a review of the explanations of the gender difference in risk taking. The 
explanations include emotions, overconfidence, and risk as a challenge or threats. 
Emotions: The sense of emotion is stronger for women than for men. The experience of 
stronger emotion can affect the utility of a risky choice. Particularly, women become more nervous 
and fearful than men in anticipation of negative outcomes (Brody (1993), Fujita, Diener and Sandvik 
(1991)). This could be an explanation of higher risk aversion in women. Further, research has shown 
that in the same situation women are fearful whereas men are angry. Grossman and Wood (1993) 
and Lerner et al. (2003) find that an angry person evaluates a given gamble as less risky than a person 
who is afraid. Combined, it can be said that women show higher risk aversion than men. 
Overconfidence: Though both men and women are overconfident, men are more 
overconfident in their success in uncertain situations than women. This overconfidence translates to 
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the attitude towards risk taking and could be another explanation for the gender disparity in risk 
avoidance. For a formal discussion of overconfidence, gender and corporate decisions see Huang 
and Kisgen (2013). 
 Risk as a challenge or threat: Another explanation of risk avoidance by females comes 
from different interpretations of the risky situation by males and females. Arch (1993) argues that 
males are more likely to see a risky situation as a challenge, which encourages participation whereas 
females interpret risky situations as threats that encourage avoidance.   
Also, there is literature studying the effect of gender differences in corporate decisions 
and/or corporate outcomes. Adams and Ferreira (2009) document that when the board of directors 
is more gender-diverse CEO turnover is highly correlated with poor-performance. Weber and 
Zulehner (2010) provide evidence that start-ups which have a policy of “female first hires” possess a 
higher chance of survival. Faccio, Marchina and Mura (2014) provide evidence that firms led by 
female CEOs have lower leverage, less volatile earnings, and a higher chance of survival than firms 
run by male CEOs. Huang and Kisgen (2013) report that male executives make more acquisitions 
and issue debt more often than female executives do. Administering psychometric tests to senior 
executives, Graham, Harvey and Puri (2013) find that CEOs’ behavioral traits, like optimism and 
managerial risk-aversion, are related to corporate financial policies.  
CEO gender and compensation: The research relating gender of corporate executives and 
their compensation is in a rudimentary stage with as yet mixed results. One set of studies finds that 
female executives are paid less than male executives. Jurajda and Paligorova (2009) and Kulich et al. 
(2011) provide evidence that female managers get lower compensation as compared to male 
managers. Dreher, Lee, Clerkin (2011) also find that white male managers and executives have 
compensation and mobility advantages over their female and minority counterparts. Similarly, Bell 
(2005) provides evidence that female executives get 8% to 25% less pay than their male 
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counterparts. Other studies examining CEO compensation find no gender-based disparity. Focusing 
only on CEOs, Bugeja, Matolscy and Spiropoulos (2012) find that there is no significant difference 
in total pay, salary and bonus between male and female CEOs. Adams, Gupta, Haughton and Leeth 
(2007) also find no evidence of gender disparity in CEO pay, but they find about a 16% gap in pay 
between males and females for other executive positions below the CEO.  Finally, a few recent 
studies dismiss the conventional claim that female executives are paid less and provide evidence that 
they are, in fact, paid more than their male counterparts (Gayle, Golan and Miller (2012), Hill, 
Upadhyay and Beekun (2014)). 
Thus, there is no clear consensus on whether CEO gender affects CEO compensation as the 
results so far are mixed. 
 
Data and descriptive statistics 
Sample Selection 
My sample consists of all public US companies recorded on the Execucomp database of 
Compustat from 1992 to 2005 (see below). As Execucomp does not have data for the years prior to 
1992, my sample period starts in 1992. I collect data on CEO compensation, including annual 
salaries, bonuses, new grants of restricted stocks and options, and stocks and options from previous 
grants. This database has been widely used in executive compensation literature. I construct some 
additional firm-level variables from Compustat annual database. 
I obtain patent and citation information from the National Bureau of Economics Research 
(NBER) Patent Citation database (see Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg 2001 for details). This database 
provides annual information on patent assignee names, the number of patents, the number of 
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citations received by each patent, patent’s application year, patent’s grant year, and so on for all 
patents registered and granted by the US Patent and Trademark Office between 1976 and 2006. 16 
Thus, my final sample consists of all firm year observations from the Execucomp database between 
1992 and 2005 for which the patent and citation data are available. Given that this restricts my 
sample period to 2005 I also use an alternative measure of long-term performance over a longer 
period, 1992 to 2013. 
Variable Construction 
Measuring compensation variables: I obtain variables related to CEO compensation 
directly from the Execucomp database of Compustat. I provide the detail of the construction of 
these variables in the Appendix B. 
Measuring performance variables: I use two measures of performance for my main 
analysis namely, ROA and Innovation. ROA is the one-year return on assets and indicates short-
term performance. Innovation measures the success of a patent in terms of citations. This indicates 
long-term performance of the firm. 
ROA: I construct the variable ROA using Compustat database. The measurement of ROA 
used in this study conforms to prior literature. 
Innovation: I use 2006 edition of the NBER Patent Citation database to obtain information 
on firm innovation output. The database provides detailed information for every patent. In order to 
measure firm’s innovation output I construct a measure of the impact and significance of a patent by 
counting the number of non-self-citations received by the patent.  
The number of citations per patent captures the importance and novelty of innovation 
output. Following the existing innovation literature (e.g. Fang, Tian, and Tice (2014)), I adjust the 
truncation problems associated with the NBER Patent Citation database. First, there is a gradual 
                                                 
16 Year 2006 is not used in my study due to the lack of observations for that year. 
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decrease in the number of patent applications that are eventually granted as we approach the end of 
sample period due to the lag in patent review and grant process. The second bias arises as a patent 
can keep receiving citations over a long period of time, but we can observe citations received only 
up to 2006. Following Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2001 and 2005), the truncation in citation counts 
is corrected by estimating the shape of the citation-lag distribution. The distribution of patent grants 
in the pooling sample is right skewed. Therefore, I use the natural logarithm of the citation-lag 
adjusted citations per patent as the measure of innovation.  
Measuring control variables:  I construct financial variables from Compustat database. 
The control variables used in this study conform to prior literature. I provide the details of the 
construction of these variables in the Appendix B. 
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 8 reports the distribution of female-led firms in my sample over time and across 
industries. Panel A indicates that there has been steady growth in the number of female CEOs of 
large public firms in the United States, especially since the late 1990s. The evidence in Panel B 
indicates that females have been CEOs in about half of the 48 Fama-French industries for my 
sample. However, they have served a greater number of firm-years in industries such as retail (50), 
business services (47), and pharmaceutical products (19).  
Table 9 provides summary statistics for my sample. I split my sample into firms that are led 
by male and female CEOs. The evidence in the table indicates that firms led by female CEOs pay 
them equally as the firms led by male CEOs. Specifically, I use the two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum 
test to investigate whether there are any differences in the median values of the variables. The test 
fails to reject the null hypothesis that the median values of salary, total compensation and equity 
compensation are equal for male and female CEOs at any acceptable level of confidence. Thus, it 
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can be said that, male and female CEOs get similar salary, total compensation and equity 
compensation. 
I also observe notable differences in means (and/or medians) between firms with male 
CEOs and firms with female CEOs for almost all the firm-level variables. For example, the mean 
number of patents for male-led firms is 15.11 whereas it is 8.24 for female-led firms. Similarly, I 
observe difference in total citations and innovation between firms with female and male CEOs, each 
being visibly larger for firms with male CEOs. These statistics provide preliminary indication that 
male CEOs are more innovative than female CEOs. Firms led by female CEOs tend to be smaller in 
size. It is also not surprising to find that firms led by female CEOs also have lower Tobin’s Q 
(median) and market-to-book ratio as these variables capture long-term effects of current 
investments. 
However, it is also interesting to note that firms with female CEOs have significantly 
different (lower) leverage and higher cash reserves as compared to firms led by male CEOs. This 
suggests that female CEOs have a preference for financial slack (by having lower leverage and 
greater cash holdings).17 
 
Empirical Methodology and Results 
Empirical Methodology  
 To examine whether, conditional on short-term performance, female CEOs are 
compensated differently from male CEOs, I proceed as follows. First, I examine whether both 
short- and long-term corporate outcomes are compensated. Second, I analyze whether female CEOs 
have any preference for short- or long-term outcomes. Finally, I examine whether the gender of the 
                                                 
17 I also find that the (unreported) correlations of some of the variables used in this study are significant; but none of the 
correlations are high enough to present collinearity problems for my multivariate analyses. 
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CEO has any impact on compensation in a multivariate setting conditioning on any gender-based 
preferences for short- or long-term outcomes. 
One bias that can occur in my coefficient estimates (impacting their validity and 
interpretation) may possibly be from omitted variables that can jointly influence short- and long-
term CEO compensation, or short- and long-term performance. For example, more talented CEOs 
might have higher ROA (short-term performance) and also more patents/citations (long-term 
performance). Omitting variables that capture CEO talent from my regression specifications could 
inflate the t-statistics and we might observe spurious correlation. Also, the decisions related to short- 
or long-term goals may not be independent decisions, leading to correlated model residuals. In order 
to address such possibilities, I employ Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) technique.  Basically, I 
simultaneously estimate the regressions that analyze the impact of CEO gender on the long- and 
short-term measures of performance and obtain coefficients estimates which are free from the bias 
arising from omitted variables or from the correlated error terms in the OLS regression 
specifications. The estimates obtained from the SUR technique also enable us to compare coefficient 
estimates (for CEO gender) across different models (which are treated as a system) thereby helping 
us to decide whether female CEOs have better performance for short- or long-term corporate 
actions. In order to address any issues related to self-selection bias I use the propensity score-
matching approach to construct a matched sample of male and female-led firms and conduct 
univariate as well as multivariate analysis of the compensation variables using this sample.  I also 
execute a simultaneous equations model using the three-stage least squares (3SLS) procedure which, 
recognizing the potential endogeneity between compensation and performance, jointly estimate both 
in a simultaneous equations framework. This method is employed to address any concerns of 
endogeneity. 
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As some of these techniques haven’t been widely used in the finance literature (though they 
are frequently used in economics and other fields), I elaborate on these techniques here. 
Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR): Researchers use Zellner’s (1962) Seemingly 
Unrelated Regression (SUR) to address problems arising from limited number of observations 
available for estimation, bias that might arise from omitted variables, and other reasons (Griffiths, 
Hill, and Judge (1993)). SUR consists of several regression equations, each with its own dependent 
variable and possibly different sets of independent variables and each such regression is a valid 
model in its own.  The added advantage of SUR is that the error terms can be assumed to be 
correlated across the regression equations. If the error terms are uncorrelated, then SUR is 
equivalent to OLS. With SUR, if the impact of an omitted variable is consistent across a set of 
regressions, model estimation is improved by incorporation into the estimation of the model 
information captured by the covariance of the error terms across the set of regressions. The error 
terms are assumed to be serially independent, but they are allowed to be cross-sectionally dependent. 
Hence, it allows for interdependence among firms. 
Propensity Score Matching: I use the propensity score-matching approach to address any 
issues related to self-selection bias. My aim is to obtain a control group (male-led firms) whose 
members have the same propensity to belong to the treatment group (female-led firms). The 
matching is executed using a logit regression (choice model) of the female CEO dummy variable on 
firm size and leverage. I then use the propensity scores obtained from the logit regression and 
perform a one-to-one nearest neighbor match without replacement to select firms with male CEOs. 
Finally, I analyze whether there is a difference in male and female CEO compensation in univariate 
as well as multivariate setting using the propensity score-matched sample. 
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Three-Stage Least Squares (3SLS): I estimate a simultaneous equations model using the 
3SLS procedure to address potential endogeneity between compensation and performance variables 
in a simultaneous equations framework. This study utilizes 3SLS because it provides consistent 
estimates of the parameters; whereas ordinary least squares estimates are both biased and inefficient. 
In addition, because 3SLS is a full-information estimator, it produces parameter estimates that are 
asymptotically more efficient than 2SLS. Three models are estimated using three-stage least squares 
(3SLS) namely the i) model for total compensation; ii) model for ROA (measure of short-term 
performance); and iii) model for innovation (measure of long-term performance). This methodology 
helps in the joint analysis of the determinants of CEO compensation and determinants of the 
performance measures considering the three models as a system of simultaneous equations. As 
reported in Alford and Berger (1999), comparison of the OLS and 3SLS estimates suggests that the 
OLS and simultaneous equations results are different in some cases and estimates using 3SLS are 
generally better. 
Results 
Are Short-term and long-term measures of performance compensated? In this 
subsection I examine whether the short- and long-term performances of CEOs are compensated. I 
estimate the following equation for total compensation and its components: 
 
Compensation
i,t
=α0 + α1Innovationi,t + α2ROAi,t + α3Returni,t  + α4Stock Volatilityi,t + α5Sizei,t + α6Cashi,t-1 
 + α7Leveragei,t-1+ α8
Market to Booki,t-1 + α9CEO Agei,t + α10CEO Tenurei,t + α11CEO Dualityi,t  
+ Year Dummies + Industry Dummies + εi,t      (5) 
 
The results are reported in Table 10. In the model for total compensation, Model 1, I find 
that the coefficient estimates on Innovation and ROA are positive and highly significant (at the 1% 
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level), suggesting that both short- and long-term firm outcomes are compensated. It is also 
interesting to note that the results indicate that short-term outcomes have a greater bearing on total 
compensation as compared to long-term outcomes.  That is, a 1 percentage point increase in ROA, 
say, from the sample mean of 14% to 15%, increases the total compensation by 0.93%. Given that 
the sample average total compensation is $4,104,000, this leads to approximately $38,167 increase in 
total compensation. On the other hand, a 1% increase in the number of citations per patent (success 
in innovation) increases total compensation by 0.00021 units which, given the sample average, leads 
to an increase of $ 858.18 
I also examine the impact of short- and long-term outcomes on short- and long-term 
compensation, Models 2 and 3, respectively. The results in Model 2 indicate that both short- and 
long-term outcomes receive short-term compensation.19 However, in Model 3, only long-term 
performance earns statistically significant long-term compensation. That is, short-term activities that 
generate short-term outcomes are not significantly compensated with long-term compensation. 
The control variables used in this study conform to previous empirical studies. Several 
studies have shown that firm size is an important variable in explaining variations in CEO 
Compensation. Generally, larger firms pay higher compensation to their CEOs (Gomez-Mejia et al. 
(1987), Core et al. (1999)). The existing literature in agency theory also suggests that leverage acts as 
a control mechanism to resolve agency problems (Jensen (1986)). Hence, higher leverage ratios 
would prevent CEOs from misusing firm’s resources to pay themselves higher compensation. Ryan 
and Wiggins (2001) find CEO characteristics like age and tenure to be important determinants of 
CEO compensation. The control variables in all the models have expected signs. CEO 
                                                 
18 Since innovation is measured as the natural log of (citation counts/patent), this is estimated as follows: for an α% 
increase in innovation there is an increase of approximately 𝛽1̂ × 𝑙𝑛 (
[100+α]
100
) units of compensation, which is in dollars. 
19 Comparing standardized coefficient estimates (unreported), the evidence indicates that a one-standard deviation 
change in ROA has a statistically significantly greater impact on short-term compensation than a similar change in 
success in innovation. 
 40 
 
compensation (total, short- and, long-term compensation) increases with firm size and stock market 
return whereas an increase in leverage has a negative impact on CEO compensation. Also, firms 
with higher cash balances and higher market-to-book ratios offer higher total compensation to their 
CEOs. 
CEO gender and performance: In these next set of regressions, I analyze whether female 
CEOs exhibit any difference in achieving short- or long-term outcomes. I use the following 
specifications to study these relationships:  
Innovationi,t=β0+β1Femalei+β2 ln(Sale)i,t +β3Leveragei,t +  β4Tobin
's Q
i,t
+ β
5 
PPEi,t+ β6 R&Di,t 
+β
7
Cashi,t+ β8CEO Agei,t + β9CEO Tenurei,t+β10Firm agei,t+εi,t.                                            (6) 
 
ROAi,t=δ0+δ1Femalei+δ2 ln(MVE)i,t +δ3Cashi,t+δ4Stock Volatilityi,t+δ5CEOAgei,t 
+δ6CEO Tenurei,t+δ7Firm agei,t+εi,t.                  (7) 
 
The results are reported in Table 11. The main variable of interest is the gender dummy 
(female) and its impact on long-term performance and short-term performance. The evidence 
indicates that female CEOs are better at achieving short-term goals (significant and positive in 
determining ROA), whereas they perform poorly in achieving long-term goals (significant and 
negative in determining success in innovation), relative to male CEOs. Specifically, female CEOs 
have about 10% greater ROA than their male counterparts, but about 24% less success in 
innovation.20 
                                                 
20 Using the sample mean ROA of 0.14, the first result is obtained from 0.014/0.14. The second is derived from (exp(-
0.276)-1) since the dependent variable, innovation, is in natural logs 
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The control variables in Models 1 and 2 have expected signs. From Model 1, the evidence 
indicates that firms with higher sales, higher R&D expenses, and higher market-to-book ratios 
innovate more whereas firms with higher leverage ratios and greater investment in tangible assets 
innovate less. From Model 2, it is evident that bigger firms (with greater market capitalization) have 
better ROA whereas firms with volatile returns report lower ROA. 
Innovation is a time consuming and high-risk process with a significant probability of failure. 
It is standard practice to measure long-term performance of a firm (or a CEO) by patent and the 
citations associated with patents. On the other hand, improving ROA of the firm is a relatively less 
risky short-term outcome. The results suggest that female CEOs place more emphasis on the 
achievement of short-term goals and relatively less effort on the long-term goals. Thus, these results 
are consistent with greater risk-aversion on the part of female CEOs. 
CEO gender and compensation: In this subsection I examine whether there is gender 
disparity in CEO compensation using the following model: 
Compensation
i,t
=α0 + α1Femalei + α2Returni,t + α3Stock Volatilityi,t +α4Sizei,t + α5Cashi,t-1 
 + α6Leveragei,t-1+ α7Market to Booki,t-1 + α8CEO Agei,t + α9CEO Tenurei,t + α10CEO Dualityi,t 
+ Year Dummies + Industry Dummies + εi,t.    (8) 
 
 
The dependent variable is the natural log of inflation-adjusted total CEO compensation and 
its short- and long-term components. In this regression, in addition to controlling for the usual 
variables that are known to affect CEO compensation, I also include the CEO gender dummy 
(female). Year fixed effects are included to account for potential economy-wide changes in 
compensation that affect all firms across all industries equally over time and industry fixed effects 
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are included to control for time-invariant factors that may affect firms in one industry relative to 
others.  
The results are reported in Table 12. For the model of total compensation, Model 1, the 
evidence indicates that the coefficient estimate on the CEO gender dummy variable (female) is 
positive but insignificant. In next model, Model 2, I keep the same specification, but change the 
dependent variable to short-term compensation. Short-term compensation is the sum of salary and 
bonus obtained by the CEO during the year. Once again, I find that the coefficient estimate on 
CEO gender dummy (female) is positive but insignificant. Finally, in Model 3 the dependent variable 
is CEOs’ long-term compensation. Long-term compensation is measured as the sum of option 
awards, stock awards, and restricted stock grants. In this model, I also find that long-term 
compensation is insignificantly related to gender dummy. Overall, in these specifications, the 
evidence indicates that CEO compensation is not affected by CEOs’ gender after controlling for 
other factors which have previously been shown to influence CEO compensation. This result lends 
support to Bugeja, Matolcsy and Spiropoulos (2012) who also find similar compensation for male 
and female CEOs in US firms. 
Given that my main goal is to examine whether, conditional on long- and short-term 
performance, there is gender disparity in CEO compensation I also include short- and long-term 
performance measures and the interaction terms between CEO gender and the short- and long-term 
performance measures in the above models of compensation to determine the conditional impact of 
performance on female CEOs’ compensation. I estimate the following equation for the different 
compensation variables: 
Compensation
i,t
= α0 + α1Innovationi,t + α2ROAi,t + α3Femalei+ α4Femalei × Innovationi,t  
+ α5Femalei × ROAi,t+ α6Returni,t + α7Stock Volatilityi,t + α8Sizei,t + α9Cashi,t-1 + α10Leveragei,t-1 
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+ α11Market to Booki,t-1+ α12CEO Agei,t + α13CEO Tenurei,t + α14CEO Duality𝑖,𝑡  
+ Year Dummies + Industry Dummies + εi,t.                 (9) 
 
The results are reported in Models 4-6 of Table 12. The results in Model 4 indicate that, 
conditioning on performance, female CEOs do not obtain significantly different total compensation 
relative to male CEOs. In contrast to the results for total compensation, the results in Model 5 
indicate that, given a certain level of short-term performance, female CEOs receive higher short-
term compensation than male CEOs. However, the results also indicate that for a given level of 
long-term performance female CEOs earn significantly less short-term (Model 5) and long-term 
(Model 6) compensation. 
In these models, the control variables have the expected signs. CEO compensation increases 
with firm size and stock market return whereas an increase in leverage has a negative impact on 
CEO compensation. The evidence also indicates that age and tenure are positively and significantly 
related to short-term compensation, whereas they are negatively and significantly related to long-
term compensation. This suggests that older CEOs and CEOs with longer tenure are paid 
significantly higher salary and bonuses, but lower long-term compensation. These findings are 
consistent with the previous findings that older CEOs are paid less in long-term compensation 
comprising of equity and options (Ryan and Wiggins (2001)).  
Collectively, these results indicate that success in innovation has a stronger impact on the 
long-term compensation (stocks and options) of CEOs, whereas fulfillment of short-term goals 
(higher return on assets) has a stronger effect on short-term compensation (salary and bonus).  
Female CEOs outperform male CEOs in the short-term aspect of firm operations, but 
underperform them in the long-term aspect of operations. While this is consistent with greater risk 
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aversion of female CEOs, it does not lead to a significantly different overall compensation, relative 
to their male counterparts.   
 
Robustness and endogeneity tests 
Alternative measures of performance: I assess the robustness of these results to 
alternative dependent variables for short-term and long-term outcomes of firms. I replace ROA with 
OPER as the measure of short-term outcome of a firm. OPER is calculated as cash flow from 
operating activities scaled by assets, so it is a proxy for the short-term performance of a firm. 
Similarly, I replace innovation with Tobin’s Q as a long-term measure of firm performance. King 
and Santor (2008) argue that Tobin’s Q is a forward-looking measure which reflects market value of 
the firm’s assets relative to the book value and the company’s future growth opportunities.  
The results of these robustness tests are in Table 13. In the first specification (Model 1), the 
dependent variable is TQ (Tobin’s Q) and the variable of interest is the gender dummy (female). I 
find that the coefficient estimate on female is negative and statistically significant, reconfirming that 
female CEOs achieve lower long-term performance than male CEOs.  
In the second specification (Model 2) the dependent variable is OPER. Consistent with the 
previous results, I find that the coefficient estimate on female is significant and positive suggesting 
that female CEOs have greater success in short-term outcomes.  
Our previous results are based on a sample restricted to the period 1992 to 2005 due to the 
unavailability of data on innovation after 2005. To ensure that our results are not specific to the 
shorter sample period, in Models 3 and 4 of Table 6 I use an extended sample of annual 
observations from 1992 to 2013. The results are qualitatively very similar to the results reported in 
Models 1 and 2. Thus, the results that female CEOs place more emphasis on the achievement of 
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short-term goals and relatively less effort on long-term goals remain robust not only to an alternative 
specification, but also to an extended sample period. 
Seemingly Unrelated Regressions (SUR): The result that female CEOs have 
significantly different short- and long-term performance relative to male CEOs is consistent with my 
expectation. However, because conditioning on CEOs’ preference for long- or short-term firm 
outcome is critical for the examination of possible differences in CEO compensation it is important 
to ensure that the link between gender and performance is not overstated. It is expected that the 
dependent variables, short-run and long-run outcomes of the firm, are correlated and so should their 
model residuals. Therefore, estimating them separately using OLS could overstate the significance of 
the coefficient estimates. In order to address these concerns I re-estimate the models of short- and 
long-term performances on gender using a Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) model. 
The results are reported in Models 3 and 4 of Table 10. The results of the SUR models are 
qualitatively very similar to the results from the OLS specifications. Exploiting the joint estimation 
of long- and short-term firm outcomes using the SUR models, I continue to find that female CEOs 
outperform male CEOs in short-term outcomes, but perform relatively poorly for long-term 
outcomes (the difference in coefficient estimates for female is 0.28 and the z-statistic for the 
difference is 3.32). The results from Models 5 and 6 of Table 13 that are based on alternative 
measures of performance further support these findings. 
These results are consistent with the view that female CEOs avoid risky activities 
(Holmstrom (1989), Faccio, Marchina and Mura (2014), Sah (2015)). 
Propensity Score Matching: The results from the propensity score matching 
approach are reported in Table 14, Panel A and B. Panel A presents the univariate analysis of the 
compensation variables for the matched sample. The results indicate that female CEOs receive 
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higher short-term compensation as compared to their male counterparts. However, on average, male 
and female CEOs get similar total compensation and long-term compensation. 
In Panel B, I present the multivariate analysis. The model used is the same as equation (8) 
wherein the dependent variable is the natural log of inflation-adjusted total CEO compensation and 
its short- and long-term components. Using the propensity score matched sample, I find no 
evidence suggesting that CEO gender impacts total CEO compensation or its short- and long-term 
components. The results from this multivariate analysis provide robustness to results reported in 
Table 12 for the full sample. 21 
Addressing potential endogeneity: Prior literature suggests that while 
performance may drive compensation, it is also plausible that higher compensation may motivate 
managers to perform better (Hall and Liebman (1998)). To control for the possible endogenous 
relationship between CEO compensation and firm performance, I use a simultaneous equations 
model approach. That is, the causality from firm performance to CEO compensation may be 
determined by estimating those variables simultaneously. 
The simultaneous equations model is estimated using a three-stage least squares (3SLS) 
methodology. Three models are estimated using the 3SLS namely, the model for i) total 
compensation; ii) ROA (measure of short-term performance); and iii) innovation (measure for long-
term performance). The estimated models are: 
Compensation
i,t
= α0 + α1Innovationi,t + α2ROAi,t + α3Returni,t + α4Stock Volatilityi,t + α5Sizei,t + α6Cashi,t-1 
+ α7Leveragei,t-1 + α8Market to Booki,t-1 + α9CEO Agei,t + α10CEO Tenurei,t + α11CEO Dualityi,t+εi,t.   (10)  
 
 
                                                 
21
 I also conduct difference-in-difference analysis (unreported) using only those firms that experienced a transition 
from male to female CEOs (treatment group) and male to male CEOs (control group) and I find that the results are 
qualitatively similar to the previous results. 
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Innovationi,t= β0+ β1Femalei+ β2Total Compensationi,t-1+ β3ln(Sale)i,t+ β4Tobin's Qi,t+β5
Leverage
i,t
 
+ β
6
PPEi,t+β
7
R&Di,t+ β8Cashi,t+ β9CEO Agei,t + β10CEO Tenurei,t+ β11Firm Agei,t+εi,t.               (11) 
 
ROAi,t= δ0+δ1Femalei+δ2Total Compensationi,t-1+δ3
ln(MVE)i,t +δ4Cashi,t+δ5Stock Volatilityi,t 
+δ6CEO Agei,t+δ7CEO Tenurei,t+δ8Firm Agei,t+εi,t.                  (12) 
 
The results of these models are presented in Table 15. The joint analysis of the determinants 
of CEO compensation and the determinants of performance reveals that success in short-term 
outcomes (ROA) as well as success in long-term outcomes (Innovation) can increase CEOs’ total 
compensation. Further, the results indicate that female CEOs perform significantly better in short-
term activities whereas they perform poorly in long-term activities, relative to male CEOs.  
Overall, I have provided evidence that short- and long-term performances are positively and 
significantly related to various measures of compensation. In addition, the examination of the 
relationship between short-term and long-term performance of firms and the gender of CEOs 
reveals that female CEOs have superior abilities in accomplishing short-term goals whereas they 
perform poorly in accomplishing long-term goals, relative to their male counterparts. These two 
results in conjunction with the finding that both male and female CEOs get paid equally suggest that 
compensation of female CEOs is driven by their superior ability to execute short-term goals. 
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Conclusions 
Recent appointments of female CEOs to large public U.S. firms have ignited the discussion 
in the financial press about gender-based differences in CEO compensation. Likewise, there is an 
emerging literature that has so far provided mixed empirical evidence. I argue that an assessment of 
a possible gender wage gap has to account for the greater risk aversion of female CEOs and its 
potential influence on their intertemporal choices and effort regarding short-term and long-term 
corporate activities. Hence, I examine whether there are gender-based differences in short- and long-
term corporate outcomes and whether these lead to gender-based disparity in CEO compensation.  
I find that both short- and long-term corporate outcomes are compensated. Further, I find 
that female CEOs exhibit superior performance in the fulfillment of short-term corporate 
objectives, but they perform poorly in achieving long-term goals, relative to male CEOs. The relative 
differences in short- and long-term measures of performance are likely attributable to differences in 
risk-taking behaviors between male and female CEOs. I also find that, controlling for the usual 
determinants of compensation, female and male CEOs are equally compensated. Conditioning on 
short- and long-term performance, the evidence indicates that for a given level of short-term firm 
performance female CEOs earn significantly more short-term compensation than male CEOs. In 
contrast, for given level of long-term outcome, they earn significantly less long-term, or even short-
term, compensation. More important, conditioning on firm outcomes, I find no difference in total 
compensation between male and female CEOs. My findings provide evidence that female CEOs are 
better at achieving short-term outcomes of firms and that their relative expertise in successfully 
executing short-term goals drives their compensation. 
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APPENDIX A 
Variable Definitions 
Variables are computed using Compustat data except for CEO Gender, Age, Tenure and Ownership which are from 
Execucomp 
 
Variable Definition and Formula 
 
Female CEO gender dummy (female = 1, male = 0)   
Cash Holdings Ratio of cash and marketable securities to book value of assets (CHE/AT)  
Physical Cash Ratio of only cash to book value of assets (CH/AT)  
Market to Book 
(MB) 
Market-to-book ratio (((AT-CEQ)+(CSHO*PRCC_F))/AT)  
Assets Book value of assets (in $m) (AT)  
Size Natural log of book value of assets (log(AT))  
Cash Flow (CF) Firm’s profitability (cash flow/book assets) (((OIBDP-XINT-TXT-DVC)/AT))  
R&D Ratio of research and development expenses to sales (XRD/SALE)  
Capex Ratio of capital expenditures to book value of assets (CAPX/AT)  
NWC Ratio of net working capital to book value of assets ((ACT-LCT-CHE)/AT)  
Leverage 
Long-term debt plus debt in current liabilities to book value of assets 
((DLTT+DLC)/AT) 
 
Payout 
Dummy variable defined as 1 if a firm pays a common dividend (DVC) in a given year 
and 0 otherwise 
 
Payout Ratio Ratio of common dividend to book value of assets (DVC/AT)  
Acquisition  
(ACQ) 
Ratio of acquisition activity expenses to book value of assets (ACQ/AT)  
Cash Flow 
Volatility 
Industry cash flow risk (Mean of the standard deviations of CF over 10 years for firms 
in same industry) 
 
KZ Index KZ Index is the measure of firm’s financial constraints  
Firm age Number of years since a firm’s incorporation  
CEO Age Age of the CEO in a given year  
CEO Tenure Tenure of the CEO in a given year  
CEO Ownership Total percentage ownership of the CEO in the firm in a given year  
Institutional 
Ownership 
Total percentage ownership by institutional investors in the firm in a given year  
MV Market value of equity ($m) (PRCC×CSHO)  
Earnings Earnings before extraordinary items ($m) (IB+XINT+TXDI+ITCI)  
Interest Expenses Interest paid by the firm in a particular year ($m) (XINT)  
Change in Cash 
Net change in cash and marketable securities during a particular year as compared to 
previous year ($m) 
 
New Financing 
Net new financing less any old financing that is repaid during the year ($m) (SSTK-
PRSTKC+DLTIS-DLTR) 
 
Net Assets Book value of assets net of cash and marketable securities ($m) (AT-CHE)  
Sales Growth Growth in sales of the firm from year t-1 to t  
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APPENDIX B 
Variable Definitions 
Variables are computed using Compustat data, Execucomp data and NBER Patent Citation database  
 
Variable Explanation 
Salary CEO salary (SALARY) 
Bonus CEO bonus (BONUS) 
Total Compensation Total Compensation (TDC1) 
Short-term Compensation Short term Compensation (Sum of salary and bonus from Execucomp) 
Long-term Compensation Long term Compensation (Sum of equity and option grants from Execucomp) 
Patent Number of patents from the firm up to 2006  
Total_Cite Total number of citations of the patents for the firm  
Innovation Log of Citation lag-adjusted measure of citation per patent  
Female Gender dummy (female = 1, male = 0)  
CEO Age Age of the CEO 
CEO Tenure Tenure of the CEO  
CEO Duality Dummy variable=1 if the CEO is an executive director and 0 otherwise 
TQ Tobin’s Q (((AT-CEQ)+(CSHO*PRCC))/AT) 
ROA Return on Asset (OIBDP/AT) 
OPER Cash flow from Operating Activities (OANCF/AT) 
Size Log of Total Assets (log(AT)) 
Sale Net Sales (SALE) 
MVE Market Value of Equity of the firm for that year (PRCC*CSHO) 
Cash Cash scaled by Total Assets (CHE/AT) 
R&D R&D scaled by Net Sales (XRD/SALE) 
Leverage Total Liabilities divided by Assets ((DLTT+DLC)/AT) 
Market-to-Book Market to Book Ratio (((AT-CEQ)+(CSHO*PRCC_F))/AT) 
Stock Return One year return to shareholders 
PPE Tangible assets divided by Total Assets (PPENT/AT) 
Stock Volatility Volatility of the stock price of the firm for the past 60 months  
Firm age Age of the firm  
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APPENDIX C: TABLES AND FIGURES 
Table 1 
Distribution of Female CEOs over Time and Across Industries 
Panel A reports the number of female CEOs for Fortune 1500 firms covered by the Execucomp Database for each year 
of my sample. Panel B provide distribution in firm-years across the 48 Fama-French industries over my sample period.  
 
Panel A: Sample of Female CEOs by year 
Year No. of firms with Female CEOs  Year No. of firms with Female CEOs 
1992 1  2003 30 
1993 4  2004 28 
1994 7  2005 35 
1995 9  2006 38 
1996 11  2007 45 
1997 12  2008 45 
1998 18  2009 47 
1999 21  2010 51 
2000 24  2011 48 
2001 25  2012 50 
2002 28  2013 49 
 
Panel B: Sample of Female CEO firm-years by industry 
Industry  
No. of female CEO 
firm-years  
Industry  
No. of female 
CEO firm-years 
Agriculture 0 Shipbuilding, Railroad Equipment 0 
Food Products 27 Defense 21 
Candy & Soda 0 Precious Metals 0 
Beer & Liquor 7 Non-Metallic and Industrial Metal Mining 0 
Tobacco Products 6 Coal 0 
Recreation 3 Petroleum and Natural Gas 4 
Entertainment 8 Utilities 0 
Printing and Publishing 22 Communication 27 
Consumer Goods 24 Personal Services 16 
Apparel 20 Business Services 118 
Healthcare 7 Computers 12 
Medical Equipment 10 Electronic Equipment 8 
Pharmaceutical Products 46 Measuring and Control Equipment 4 
Chemicals 5 Business Supplies 0 
Rubber and Plastic Products 4 Shipping Containers 2 
Textiles 3 Transportation 4 
Construction Materials 18 Wholesale 1 
Construction 0 Retail  133 
Steel Works etc. 3 Restaurants, Hotels, Motels 31 
Fabricated Products 3 Banking 0 
Machinery 21 Insurance 0 
Electrical Equipment 0 Real Estate 0 
Automobiles and Trucks 1 Trading 0 
Aircraft 1 Miscellaneous 6 
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Table 2 
Summary Statistics of Male- and Female-Led Firms 
The variables are: Cash Holdings, the ratio of cash and marketable securities to book value of assets; market-to-book ratio (MB), (book value of assets minus the book 
value of equity plus the market value of equity)/book value of assets; Assets, the book value of assets in $m; firm size (Size), the natural log of book value of assets; 
firm’s profitability (CF), cash flow/book assets, where cash flow is measured as earnings after interest, dividends, and taxes but before depreciation; R&D, research and 
development expenses divided by sales; Capex, capital expenditure/assets; NWC, net working capital/total assets; Leverage, (long-term debt plus debt in current 
liabilities)/book assets; payout, a dummy variable defined as 1 if a firm pays a common dividend in a given year, and 0 otherwise; AQC, the intensity of acquisition 
activities measured as acquisitions/assets; CFvolatility, industry cash flow risk measured as the mean of the standard deviations of the ratio of cash flow/assets over 10 
years for firms in the same industry, as defined by the two-digit SIC codes, with the additional requirement that the industry must have at least three observations; KZ 
Index is the measure of firm’s financial constraints; Firmage is the number of years since a firm’s incorporation; CEO Age is the age of CEO calculated using Execucomp 
data; CEO Tenure is the tenure of the CEO calculated using Execucomp data; CEO Ownership represents the total percentage ownership of the CEO in the firm; 
Institutional Ownership represents the total percentage ownership by institutional investors in the firm; MV is the market value of equity; Earnings is the earnings before 
extraordinary items; Interest Expenses represents the interest paid by the firm in a particular year; Change in Cash is the net change in cash and marketable securities during 
a particular year; and New Financing is the net new financing that the firm obtains in a given year, which takes into account any old financing that is repaid during the 
year. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. All dollar values are in 2002 dollars. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ represent significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 
0.10 levels. 
 
  N Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean Median  Wilcoxon rank-sum 
significance  Variable All Firms Male CEOs Female CEOs 
Cash Holdings 27762 0.15 0.08 27136 0.15 0.08 626 0.19 0.15 *** 
Market to Book 27762 2.07 1.61 27136 2.08 1.63 626 2 1.5 *** 
Assets ($m) 27762 4655.5 1062 27136 4656.19 1064.29 626 4624.2 790.69 *** 
Cash Flow 27762 0.08 0.09 27136 0.08 0.09 626 0.08 0.08 *** 
R&D 27762 0.05 0 27136 0.05 0 626 0.05 0 *** 
Capex 27762 0.06 0.04 27136 0.06 0.04 626 0.05 0.03 *** 
Net Working Capital 27762 0.07 0.07 27136 0.07 0.07 626 0.06 0.05 
 Leverage 27762 0.22 0.2 27136 0.22 0.2 626 0.19 0.15 *** 
Payout 27762 0.49 0 27136 0.49 0 626 0.46 0 
 Acquisition 27762 0.03 0 27136 0.03 0 626 0.03 0 *** 
KZ index 27762 -4.94 -1.62 27136 -4.88 -1.6 626 -7.48 -2.05 *** 
Firm age (Years) 27762 24.3 19 27136 24.3 19 626 24.24 18 *** 
CEO Age (Years) 26525 55.35 55 25922 55.41 55 603 52.84 53 *** 
CEO Tenure (Years) 26921 7.86 6 26302 7.9 6 619 6.38 5 *** 
Earnings ($m) 25265 375.5 71.23 24671 374.55 71.97 594 415.02 48.49 *** 
Change in Cash ($m) 25265 38.48 3.36 24671 38.17 3.4 594 51.31 1.62 ** 
New Financing ($m) 25265 -36.15 -2.67 24671 -35.63 -2.58 594 -49.49 -4.68 * 
MV ($m) 25265 6818.26 1273.98 24671 7130.4 1308.14 594 6152.4 847.2 *** 
Interest Expenses ($m) 25265 79.48 14.44 24671 79.16 14.52 594 92.84 8.67 *** 
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Table 3 
Effect of CEO Gender on Cash Holdings 
This table reports regression results of Cash Holdings on Female, the CEO gender dummy variable, defined as 1 if the 
firm’s CEO is female in a given year t and 0 otherwise, plus various control variables. All variables are defined in 
Appendix 1. “Panel FE” are panel models with industry and year fixed effects. The models are estimated with 
heteroskedasticity-adjusted standard errors (in parentheses), except for the Fama-McBeth model. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ 
represent significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels. 
 
  Fixed Effects Fixed Effects Fixed Effects Fama-MacBeth Random Effects 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Female 0.0224** 0.0263** 0.0341** 0.0404*** 0.0107**  
 
(0.010) (0.012) (0.017) (0.011) (0.005)    
Market to Book  0.0232*** 0.0229*** 0.0226*** 0.0233*** 0.0169*** 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)    
Size -0.0223*** -0.0211*** -0.0227*** -0.0195*** -0.0242*** 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)    
Cash Flow -0.0200 -0.0242 -0.0683** -0.0082 -0.0042    
 
(0.024) (0.024) (0.028) (0.020) (0.009)    
R&D 0.3956*** 0.3913*** 0.3865*** 0.4573*** 0.2193*** 
 
(0.029) (0.031) (0.034) (0.017) (0.010)    
Capex -0.5312*** -0.5296*** -0.5242*** -0.5398*** -0.5109*** 
 
(0.034) (0.034) (0.039) (0.022) (0.015)    
Net Working Capital -0.2962*** -0.2971*** -0.3094*** -0.2514*** -0.2992*** 
 
(0.015) (0.015) (0.020) (0.009) (0.007)    
Leverage -0.2130*** -0.2070*** -0.2139*** -0.2410*** -0.1608*** 
 
(0.011) (0.011) (0.014) (0.005) (0.005)    
Payout -0.0212*** -0.0212*** -0.0220*** -0.0294*** -0.0048**  
 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002)    
Acquisition -0.3269*** -0.3293*** -0.3574*** -0.3167*** -0.2441*** 
 
(0.014) (0.014) (0.018) (0.020) (0.009)    
Cash Flow Volatility 0.2858*** 0.2833*** 0.3221** 0.4670*** 0.5156*** 
 
(0.099) (0.106) (0.125) (0.088) (0.034)    
Firm age -0.0004*** -0.0004*** -0.0004*** -0.0005*** -0.0003*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)    
Constant 0.3212*** 0.3395*** 0.3138*** 0.3378*** 0.3657*** 
 
(0.022) (0.028) (0.036) (0.009) (0.007)    
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes No No 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes No No 
CEO Characteristics No Yes Yes No No 
Institutional Investors No No Yes No No 
      
R-squared 0.579 0.582 0.602 0.553 0.529 
Observations 27728 25730 16329 27728 27728 
 
 
  
 61 
 
Table 4  
Addressing Potential Endogeneity 
In this table the dependent variable is Cash Holdings. In Models 1 and 2, Female is defined as 1 if the firm’s CEO is female 
in a given year t and 0 otherwise. In Models 3 to 5 it is 1 if the firm experienced a transition from a male CEO to a 
female CEO and 0 for a male-to-male transition. The first two models report the results from a propensity-score 
matched sample. The next three models report difference-in-differences regression results. The difference-in-differences 
test uses only those firms that experience a transition from male to female CEOs (treatment group) and from male to 
male CEOs (control group) during my sample period. Post_transition is 0 before CEO change and 1 after the change. All 
variables are defined in Appendix 1. The models are estimated with heteroskedasticity-adjusted standard errors (in 
parentheses) except for Model 2. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ represent significant at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels. 
 
 
  Fixed Effects Fama-MacBeth Difference-in-Difference 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Female 0.0220** 0.0361*** -0.0582 
 
                
 
(0.010) (0.012)    (0.048) 
 
                
Post_transition 
  
0.0039* 0.0025 0.0012    
   
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)    
Female × Post_transition 
  
0.0833* 0.0221*** 0.0090* 
   
(0.049) (0.008) (0.005)    
Market to Book 0.0238*** 0.0248*** 0.0194*** 0.0199*** 0.0154*** 
 
(0.004) (0.006)    (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)    
Size -0.0258*** -0.0375*** -0.0188*** -0.0189*** -0.0238*** 
 
(0.004) (0.006)    (0.001) (0.001) (0.003)    
Cash Flow -0.0130 -0.1032    0.0072 0.0040 0.0151    
 
(0.073) (0.063)    (0.021) (0.021) (0.019)    
R&D 0.3230*** 0.4299*** 0.3951*** 0.4054*** 0.0390    
 
(0.074) (0.068)    (0.022) (0.022) (0.038)    
Capex -0.5376*** -0.4015*** -0.5552*** -0.5302*** -0.4229*** 
 
(0.104) (0.107)    (0.024) (0.025) (0.029)    
Net Working Capital -0.4016*** -0.2759*** -0.2661*** -0.2600*** -0.2687*** 
 
(0.049) (0.040)    (0.009) (0.009) (0.015)    
Leverage -0.2609*** -0.3334*** -0.2404*** -0.2362*** -0.1220*** 
 
(0.026) (0.040)    (0.008) (0.008) (0.011)    
Payout -0.0212** -0.0137    -0.0368*** -0.0350*** 0.0031    
 
(0.009) (0.012)    (0.002) (0.002) (0.004)    
Acquisition -0.3746*** -0.3668*** -0.2860*** -0.2810*** -0.2357*** 
 
(0.049) (0.071)    (0.018) (0.018) (0.018)    
Cash Flow Volatility 0.0814 0.1709    0.7210*** 0.6197*** 0.4554*** 
 
(0.377) (0.638)    (0.058) (0.067) (0.082)    
Firm age -0.0002 0.0008    -0.0005*** -0.0005*** -0.0005    
 
(0.000) (0.000)    (0.000) (0.000) (0.003)    
Constant 0.2673*** 0.4600*** 0.3301*** 0.3486*** 0.3823*** 
 
(0.090) (0.049)    (0.009) (0.015) (0.072)    
      R-squared 0.624 0.664    0.544 0.547 0.840    
Observations 1245 1245 10685 10685 10685 
Industry Yes No No No No 
Year FE Yes No No Yes Yes 
Firm FE No No No No Yes 
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Table 5  
Speed of Adjustment of Cash 
This table reports the regression of the change in cash holdings on Female, the CEO gender dummy variable, defined as 1 if 
the firm’s CEO is female in a given year t and 0 otherwise. Cash* is the expected level of cash for each firm estimated 
with the coefficient estimates from the fitted model of equation (1) using the propensity score-matched sample of male- 
and female-led firms. “Full sample” consists of all observations, “Deficit” consists of top quartile of observations 
indicating a greater deficit from the expected cash levels, and “Surplus” consists of bottom quartile of observations 
indicating presence of excess cash (lowest deficit as compared to the expected cash levels). All variables are defined in 
Appendix 1. The models are estimated with heteroskedasticity-adjusted standard errors (in parentheses). ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ 
represent significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels. 
 
  Full Sample Deficit Surplus 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Female 0.0015 -0.0102 -0.0251**  
 
(0.003) (0.012) (0.012)    
(Cash* - Lagged Cash)  0.2449*** 0.2172*** 0.2753*** 
 
(0.005) (0.018) (0.014)    
Female ×(Cash*-Lagged Cash) 0.0047 0.1188* -0.0902    
 
(0.029) (0.063)    (0.063)    
Constant 0.0076*** 0.0053*** 0.0113*** 
 
(0.000) (0.002) (0.003)    
    
R-squared 0.183 0.040 0.088    
Observations 25265 6316 6316 
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Table 6  
CEO Gender and the Use of Excess Cash 
This table reports logit regressions of the probability that a dividend-paying firm increases its dividend payout ratio 
(paying), increases its repayment of debt (repaying), increases its investment in R&D, capital expenditure, and acquisitions 
(investing), or increasing repurchases (repurchasing), on Female, the CEO gender dummy variable, defined as 1 if the firm’s 
CEO is female in a given year t and 0 otherwise, plus various control variables. All variables are defined in Appendix 1. 
The models are estimated with heteroskedasticity-adjusted standard errors (in parentheses). ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ represent 
significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels. 
 
  Paying Repaying Investing Repurchasing 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Female 0.3781** 0.1470 -0.1409 0.1540    
 
(0.169) (0.168) (0.162) (0.174)    
Size 0.4693*** 0.0354* 0.0003 0.1508*** 
 
(0.024) (0.020) (0.021) (0.021)    
Cash Flow 1.4465*** 0.4475 2.6680*** 3.0855*** 
 
(0.407) (0.341) (0.371) (0.372)    
Cash Flow Volatility -5.2074* 0.0528 -3.8094 -0.3148    
 
(3.086) (2.423) (2.619) (2.980)    
Sales Growth -0.0052*** -0.0038* 0.0125*** -0.0003    
 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)    
Leverage -2.1835*** 0.2394 -0.4280** -0.9617*** 
 
(0.238) (0.173) (0.180) (0.199)    
Constant -1.2127 1.6595* 0.0382 -3.2699*** 
 
(0.798) (0.917) (0.815) (1.191)    
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Pseudo R-squared 0.1716 0.0307 0.0798 0.0853 
Observations 6,316 6,316 6,316 6,316 
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Table 7 
 CEO Gender and the Marginal Value of Cash Holdings 
This table reports the regression of excess stock returns on the interaction between change in cash holdings and Female, the 
CEO gender dummy variable, defined as 1 if the firm’s CEO is female in a given year t and 0 otherwise, plus various 
control variables. All variables (except Female and leverage) are scaled by lagged market value (MVt-1). All variables are 
defined in Appendix 1. The models are estimated with heteroskedasticity-adjusted standard errors (in parentheses). ∗∗∗, 
∗∗, and ∗ represent significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels. 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Female 
 
-0.0345** -0.0368**  
  
(0.017) (0.017)    
ΔCash Holdings 0.3705*** 0.3701*** 0.3667*** 
 
(0.086) (0.086) (0.086)    
Female × ΔCash Holdings 
  
0.3938*   
   
(0.209)    
ΔEarnings 0.0429*** 0.0428*** 0.0429*** 
 
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011)    
ΔNet Assets 0.0461*** 0.0460*** 0.0458*** 
 
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011)    
ΔR&D Expenses -0.0380 -0.0359 -0.0103    
 
(0.237) (0.237) (0.238)    
ΔInterest Expenses -0.0943 -0.0942 -0.0952    
 
(0.155) (0.155) (0.154)    
ΔDividends 0.4851** 0.4839** 0.4872**  
 
(0.206) (0.206) (0.206)    
Lagged(Cash Holdings) -0.0177** -0.0176** -0.0172**  
 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008)    
Leverage -0.0078* -0.0078* -0.0078*   
 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)    
New Financing -0.0563*** -0.0563*** -0.0564*** 
 
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014)    
Lagged(Cash Holdings) × ΔCash Holdings -0.0171*** -0.0171*** -0.0170*** 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)    
Leverage ×ΔCash Holdings -0.2391* -0.2388* -0.2363*   
 
(0.124) (0.124) (0.123)    
Constant 0.1539*** 0.1532*** 0.1530*** 
 
(0.047) (0.047) (0.047)    
    
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
    
R-squared 0.044 0.044 0.044    
Observations 25,260 25,260 25,260 
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Table 8 
Distribution of Female CEOs over Time and Across Industries 
Panel A reports the number of female CEOs for Fortune 1500 firms covered by the Execucomp Database for each 
sample year. Panel B provide distribution in firm-years across the 48 Fama-French industries over the sample period. 
The sample period is 1992 to 2005, due to the availability of NBER’s data on innovation required for the empirical tests 
below. 
 
Panel A: Sample of Female CEOs by year 
Year No. of firms with Female CEOs   Year No. of firms with Female CEOs 
1992 1 
 
1999 20 
1993 4 
 
2000 24 
1994 7 
 
2001 23 
1995 9 
 
2002 26 
1996 11 
 
2003 27 
1997 12 
 
2004 25 
1998 17   2005 24 
 
Panel B: Sample of Female CEO firm-years by industry 
Industry  
No. of female 
CEO firm-years  
Industry  
No. of female 
CEO firm-years 
Agriculture 0 Shipbuilding, Railroad Equipment 0 
Food Products 0 Defense 12 
Candy & Soda 0 Precious Metals 0 
Beer & Liquor 0 Non-Metallic and Industrial Metal Mining 0 
Tobacco Products 1 Coal 0 
Recreation 3 Petroleum and Natural Gas 0 
Entertainment 0 Utilities 0 
Printing and Publishing 6 Communication 4 
Consumer Goods 14 Personal Services 8 
Apparel 15 Business Services 47 
Healthcare 4 Computers 10 
Medical Equipment 4 Electronic Equipment 0 
Pharmaceutical Products 19 Measuring and Control Equipment 0 
Chemicals 0 Business Supplies 0 
Rubber and Plastic Products 0 Shipping Containers 0 
Textiles 3 Transportation 0 
Construction Materials 8 Wholesale 1 
Construction 0 Retail  50 
Steel Works etc. 0 Restaurants, Hotels, Motels 4 
Fabricated Products 2 Banking 0 
Machinery 4 Insurance 0 
Electrical Equipment 0 Real Estate 0 
Automobiles and Trucks 1 Trading 0 
Aircraft 0 Miscellaneous 10 
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Table 9 
Summary Statistics 
This table presents the summary statistics. All variables are defined in the Appendix. The full sample consists of annual observations between 1992 and 2005.  All 
continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. All dollar values are in 2002 dollars.  ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ represent significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 
levels. 
Variable N Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean Median Wilcoxon 
rank-sum 
significance   All CEOs Male CEOs Female CEOs 
Salary ($ thousands) 17187 635.44 574.53 16957 635.23 574.53 230 650.7 561.21 
 
Bonus ($ thousands) 17187 620.01 350 16957 621.55 352.79 230 506.23 239.98 *** 
Equity Compensation($ thousands) 17187 2409.93 785.78 16957 2405.25 785.33 230 2755.2 807.89 
 
Total Compensation ($ thousands) 17021 4104.1 2148.81 16792 4103.4 2153.96 229 4155.5 1849.64 
 
Patent (Number) 17187 15.02 0 16957 15.11 0 230 8.24 0 *** 
Total Cites (Number) 17187 108.6 0 16957 109.93 0 230 10.53 0 *** 
Innovation 17187 0.81 0 16957 0.82 0 230 0.48 0 *** 
Size 17187 7.08 6.91 16957 7.09 6.92 230 6.41 6.16 *** 
Cash 17181 0.14 0.06 16951 0.14 0.06 230 0.22 0.18 *** 
R&D 17165 0.05 0 16937 0.05 0 228 0.06 0 **  
Leverage 17149 0.15 0.12 16920 0.15 0.12 229 0.11 0.06 *** 
Market-to-Book 17148 3.29 2.4 16919 3.3 2.41 229 2.96 2.02 *** 
Tobin’s Q 17149 2.17 1.65 16920 2.17 1.65 229 2.22 1.54 ** 
ROA 17187 0.14 0.14 16957 0.14 0.14 230 0.13 0.13    
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Table 10  
Evidence on Whether Short- and Long-Term Outcomes are Compensated 
This table presents the impact of long-term (Innovation) and short-term (ROA) performance measures on CEO 
compensation using panel regressions. The variable female is the CEO gender dummy variable, defined as 1 if the firm’s 
CEO is female in a given year t and 0 otherwise. The compensation values are obtained by taking the natural logarithm 
of the respective variables. All other variables are defined in the Appendix. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 
1% and 99% levels. The full sample consists of annual observations between 1992 and 2005. The terms in parentheses 
are heteroskedasticity robust standard errors. ***, **, and * represent significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels. 
Dependent Variable: CEO Compensation 
 
Total 
Compensation  
Short-term 
Compensation  
Long-term 
Compensation 
  Model 1   Model 2   Model 3 
Short-term performance (ROA) 0.933*** 
 
1.220*** 
 
0.452     
 
(0.105) 
 
(0.075) 
 
(0.347)    
Long-term performance (Innovation) 0.021*** 
 
0.012** 
 
0.052** 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.005) 
 
(0.022)    
Stock Return 0.001*** 
 
0.001*** 
 
0.002*** 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.001)    
Stock Volatility 1.814*** 
 
-0.488*** 
 
2.838*** 
 
(0.200) 
 
(0.145) 
 
(0.681)    
Size 0.487*** 
 
0.307*** 
 
0.739*** 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.005) 
 
(0.022)    
Lagged Cash 0.204*** 
 
0.031 
 
-0.046    
 
(0.072) 
 
(0.051) 
 
(0.239)    
Lagged Leverage -0.469*** 
 
-0.138** 
 
-1.535*** 
 
(0.068) 
 
(0.057) 
 
(0.253)    
Lagged Market-to-Book 0.053*** 
 
-0.028*** 
 
0.088*** 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.005) 
 
(0.025)    
CEO Age -0.003** 
 
0.004*** 
 
-0.032*** 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.004)    
CEO Tenure -0.004*** 
 
0.002*** 
 
-0.041*** 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.004)    
CEO Duality 0.035 
 
0.159* 
 
0.458    
 
(0.143) 
 
(0.088) 
 
(0.535)    
Constant 3.393*** 
 
3.971*** 
 
1.114 
 
(0.199) 
 
(0.146) 
 
(0.704) 
      
Year FE Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Industry FE Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Adj-R-sqr 0.453 
 
0.450 
 
0.163 
Observations 12823   12886   12886 
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Table 11  
Effect of CEO Gender on Measures of Performance 
This table presents the impact of CEO gender on measures of long-term and short-term performance using OLS 
regressions and seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR). Innovation is the measure of long-term performance and ROA is 
the measure of short-term performance. All other variables are defined in the Appendix. All continuous variables are 
winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. The full sample consists of annual observations between 1992 and 2005. The 
terms in parentheses are heteroskedasticity robust standard errors. ***, **, and * represent significance at the 0.01, 0.05, 
and 0.10 levels. 
Dependent Variable: Measure of Performance 
 
OLS Regression 
 
Seemingly Unrelated Regression 
 Model 1   Model 2  Model 3     Model 4 
 
Long-term (Innovation) Short-term (ROA) 
 
Long-term (Innovation) Short-term (ROA) 
Female -0.276*** 0.014*   
 
-0.264*** 0.014**  
 
(0.065) (0.008)    
 
(0.086)    (0.007)     
Log(Sale) 0.109***                 
 
0.112*** 
 
 
(0.008)                 
 
(0.008)    
 
Leverage -0.643***                 
 
-0.612*** 
 
 
(0.071)                 
 
(0.084)    
 
Tobin’s Q 0.071***                 
 
0.063***  
 
 
(0.009)                 
 
(0.007)    
 
PPE -0.313***                 
 
-0.312*** 
 
 
(0.042)                 
 
(0.051)    
 
R&D 1.897***                 
 
2.056*** 
 
 
(0.115)                 
 
(0.092)    
 
Cash 0.139 -0.039*** 
 
0.129    -0.039*** 
 
(0.088) (0.007)    
 
(0.082)    (0.005)     
CEO Age 0.004*** -0.000*** 
 
0.004*** -0.000*** 
 
(0.001) (0.000)    
 
(0.001)    (0.000)    
CEO Tenure -0.006*** 0.001*** 
 
-0.005*** 0.001*** 
 
(0.001) (0.000)    
 
(0.001)    (0.000)    
Firm age 0.005*** -0.001*** 
 
0.005*** -0.001*** 
 
(0.001) (0.000)    
 
(0.001)    (0.000)    
Log(MVE) 
 
0.015*** 
  
0.015*** 
  
(0.001)    
  
(0.001)    
Stock Volatility 
 
-0.539*** 
  
-0.537*** 
  
(0.020)    
  
(0.015)    
Constant -0.329*** 0.156*** 
 
-0.334*** 0.156*** 
 
(0.096) (0.008)    
 
(0.097)    (0.008)    
      
Adj-R-sqr 0.085 0.191    
 
                     
 
Observations 15207 14759      14706    14706    
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Table 12  
Effect of CEO Gender on Compensation 
This table presents the impact of CEO Gender on their compensation using panel regressions. The variable female is the 
CEO gender dummy variable, defined as 1 if the firm’s CEO is female in a given year t and 0 otherwise. The 
compensation values are obtained by taking the natural logarithm of the respective variables. All other variables are 
defined in the Appendix. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. The full sample consists of 
annual observations between 1992 and 2005. The terms in parentheses are heteroskedasticity robust standard errors. ***, 
**, and * represent significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels. 
Dependent Variable: CEO Compensation 
  
Total 
Compensat
ion 
Short-term 
Compensat
ion 
Long-term 
Compensat
ion 
  
Total 
Compensat
ion 
Short-term 
Compensat
ion 
Long-term 
Compensat
ion 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3   Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Short-term performance 
(ROA)     
0.922*** 1.216*** 0.440    
     
(0.105) (0.075) (0.348)    
Long-term performance 
(Innovation)     
0.022*** 0.013** 0.058**  
     
(0.008) (0.005) (0.027)    
ROA*Female 
    
0.710 0.345** 2.207    
     
(0.690) (0.170) (2.200)    
Innovation*Female 
    
-0.121 -0.082** -0.843*** 
     
(0.086) (0.039) (0.295)    
Female 0.094 0.067 -0.026    
 
0.044 0.044 0.065    
 
(0.062) (0.042) (0.237)    
 
(0.109) (0.080) (0.391)    
Stock Return 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.003*** 
 
0.001*** 0.001*** 0.002*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001)    
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001)    
Stock Volatility 1.202*** -1.306*** 2.560*** 
 
1.817*** -0.485*** 2.825*** 
 
(0.198) (0.140) (0.647)    
 
(0.200) (0.145) (0.680)    
Size 0.488*** 0.306*** 0.747*** 
 
0.487*** 0.307*** 0.740*** 
 
(0.007) (0.005) (0.022)    
 
(0.007) (0.005) (0.022)    
Lagged Cash 0.093 -0.121** -0.068    
 
0.202*** 0.030 -0.016    
 
(0.071) (0.050) (0.234)     
 
(0.072) (0.051) (0.239)    
Lagged Leverage -0.568*** -0.257*** -1.610*** 
 
-0.470*** -0.138** -1.535*** 
 
(0.066) (0.056) (0.249)    
 
(0.068) (0.057) (0.253)    
Lagged Market-to-Book 0.078*** 0.004 0.101*** 
 
0.053*** -0.028*** 0.086*** 
 
(0.008) (0.005) (0.023)    
 
(0.009) (0.005) (0.025)    
CEO Age -0.003** 0.004*** -0.032*** 
 
-0.003** 0.004*** -0.032*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.004)    
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.004)    
CEO Tenure -0.004*** 0.003*** -0.041*** 
 
-0.004*** 0.002*** -0.042*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.004)    
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.004)    
CEO Duality 0.080 0.216** 0.473    
 
0.034 0.159* 0.460    
 
(0.140) (0.090) (0.534)    
 
(0.143) (0.088) (0.536)    
Constant 3.531*** 4.154*** 1.195* 
 
3.390*** 3.968*** 1.112 
 
(0.196) (0.149) (0.700) 
 
(0.199) (0.146) (0.704) 
        
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
Adj-R-sqr 0.448 0.434 0.162 
 
0.453 0.450 0.163 
Observations 12823 12886 12886   12823 12886 12886 
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Table 13  
Effect of CEO Gender on Alternate Measures of Performance 
This table presents the impact of CEO gender on alternative measures (and extended sample period) of long-term and 
short-term performance using OLS regressions and seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR). Tobin’s Q is the measure of 
long-term performance and Cash flow from operating activities (OPER) is the measure of short-term performance. All 
other variables are defined in the Appendix. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. The 
sample for models 1, 2, 5 and 6 consists of annual observations between 1992 and 2005. The sample for models 3 and 4 
consists of annual observations between 1992 and 2013. The terms in parentheses are heteroskedasticity robust standard 
errors. ***, **, and * represent significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels. 
 
Dependent Variable: Measure of Performance 
  OLS Regression   OLS Regression   
Seemingly Unrelated 
Regression 
  Model 1 Model 2   Model 3 Model 4   Model 5 Model 6 
  
Long-term 
(Tobin’s Q) 
Short-term 
(OPER) 
  
Long-term 
(Tobin’s Q) 
Short-term 
(OPER) 
  
Long-term 
(Tobin’s Q) 
Short-term 
(OPER) 
       
                                          
Female -0.174* 0.015**  
 
-0.129*** 0.013*** 
 
-0.134* 0.015**  
 
(0.098) (0.007)    
 
(0.048) (0.004)    
 
(0.078)    (0.006)    
Log(MVE) 0.336*** 0.017*** 
 
0.262*** 0.018*** 
 
0.345*** 0.014*** 
 
(0.009) (0.001)    
 
(0.006) (0.002)    
 
(0.007)    (0.001)    
Leverage -2.738***                 
 
-2.292***                 
 
-2.330*** 
 
 
(0.071)                 
 
(0.056)                 
 
(0.079)    
 
R&D 1.188***                 
 
1.136***                 
 
1.896*** 
 
 
(0.184)                 
 
(0.148)                 
 
(0.089)    
 
Cash 2.149***                 
 
1.661***                 
 
2.036*** 
 
 
(0.118)                 
 
(0.078)                 
 
(0.076)    
 
CEO Age -0.010*** 0.000    
 
-0.011*** -0.000**  
 
-0.010*** 0.000    
 
(0.002) (0.000)    
 
(0.001) (0.000)    
 
(0.001)    (0.000)    
CEO Tenure 0.005*** 0.000*** 
 
0.005*** 0.001*** 
 
0.005*** 0.000*** 
 
(0.001) (0.000)    
 
(0.001) (0.000)    
 
(0.001)    (0.000)    
Firm age -0.018*** -0.000*** 
 
-0.016*** -0.001*** 
 
-0.018*** -0.000*** 
 
(0.001) (0.000)    
 
(0.000) (0.000)    
 
(0.001)    (0.000)    
Log(Sale) 
 
-0.000    
  
0.009*** 
  
0.004*** 
  
(0.001)    
  
(0.002)    
  
(0.001)    
Constant 0.747*** -0.021*** 
 
1.148*** -0.051*** 
 
0.583*** -0.025*** 
 
(0.097) (0.007)    
 
(0.069) (0.012)    
 
(0.092)    (0.006)    
         
Adj-R-sqr 0.387 0.076    
 
0.334 0.047    
 
                     
 
Observations 15249 15254      25730 25746      15237    15237    
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Table 14 
Effect of CEO Gender on Compensation using Propensity Score-Matched Sample 
This table presents the impact of CEO Gender on their compensation using propensity score-matched sample. Panel A 
presents the univariate analysis whereas Panel B presents the multivariate analysis using panel regressions. The variable 
female is the CEO gender dummy variable, defined as 1 if the firm’s CEO is female in a given year t and 0 otherwise. 
The compensation values used in the multivariate regressions are obtained by taking the natural logarithm of the 
respective variables. All other variables are defined in the Appendix. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% 
and 99% levels. The sample consists of annual observations between 1992 and 2005. The terms in parentheses are 
heteroskedasticity robust standard errors. ***, **, and * represent significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels. 
Panel A: Univariate Analysis 
Variable Female CEOs Male CEOs Difference 
Total compensation 4170.16 3662.75 507.42 
   
(489.74) 
Short-term compensation 1181.38 1020.28 161.10** 
   
(80.35) 
Long-term compensation 2778.59 2322.45 456.14 
      (421.31) 
 
Panel B: Multivariate Analysis 
Dependent Variable: CEO Compensation 
  Total Compensation   Short-term Compensation   Long-term Compensation 
  Model 1   Model 2   Model 3 
Female 0.041 
 
0.081 
 
-0.194    
 
(0.111) 
 
(0.074) 
 
(0.405)    
Stock Return 0.002** 
 
0.001** 
 
0.008**  
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.003)    
Stock Volatility 2.246* 
 
-0.331 
 
0.568    
 
(1.172) 
 
(0.894) 
 
(4.145)    
Size 0.586*** 
 
0.349*** 
 
0.995*** 
 
(0.036) 
 
(0.026) 
 
(0.129)    
Lagged Cash 0.480 
 
0.212 
 
0.936    
 
(0.404) 
 
(0.276) 
 
(1.362)    
Lagged Leverage -1.270*** 
 
-0.218 
 
-1.339    
 
(0.442) 
 
(0.302) 
 
(1.772)    
Lagged Market-to-Book -0.003 
 
-0.014 
 
-0.020    
 
(0.036) 
 
(0.027) 
 
(0.135)    
CEO Age -0.016* 
 
-0.002 
 
-0.101*** 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.035)    
CEO Tenure 0.006 
 
-0.001 
 
-0.002    
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.004) 
 
(0.027)    
CEO Duality -1.650*** 
 
-0.058 
 
-2.379*   
 
(0.338) 
 
(0.285) 
 
(1.312)    
Constant 4.805*** 
 
3.944*** 
 
5.341* 
 
(0.941) 
 
(0.652) 
 
(3.172) 
      
Year FE Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Industry FE Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Adj-R-sqr 0.615 
 
0.574 
 
0.335 
Observations 346   346   346 
 72 
 
Table 15 
Joint Analysis of Compensation and Performance  
This table presents the joint analysis of the determinants of CEO compensation and performance measures using 3-Stage Least Square methodology (3SLS) and 
considering the three models as a system of simultaneous equations. The variable female is the CEO gender dummy variable, defined as 1 if the firm’s CEO is female 
in a given year t and 0 otherwise. Total Compensation is the measure of CEO Compensation. The compensation values are obtained by taking the natural logarithm of 
the respective variables. Innovation is the measure of long-term performance and ROA is the measure of short-term performance. All other variables are defined in the 
Appendix. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. The full sample consists of annual observations between 1992 and 2005. The terms in 
parentheses are heteroskedasticity robust standard errors. ***, **, and * represent significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels. 
Simultaneous Regressions using 3-Stage Least Square Methodology 
Total Compensation 
 
Long-term performance (Innovation) 
 
Short-term performance (ROA) 
   Model 1 
  
Model 2 
  
       Model 3 
 
Short-term performance (ROA) 4.701*** 
 
Female -0.154**  
 
Female 0.012* 
 
(0.210)    
  
(0.069)    
  
(0.007)    
Long-term performance (Innovation) 0.630*** 
 
Lagged(Log(Total Compensation)) 0.292*** 
 
Lagged(Log(Total Compensation)) 0.000    
 
(0.050)    
  
(0.009)    
  
(0.001)    
Stock Return 0.000    
 
Log(Sale) -0.025*** 
 
Log(MVE) 0.016*** 
 
(0.000)    
  
(0.009)    
  
(0.001)    
Stock Volatility 3.849*** 
 
Leverage -0.432*** 
 
Cash -0.037*** 
 
(0.229)    
  
(0.081)    
  
(0.006)    
Size 0.383*** 
 
TQ 0.044*** 
 
Stock Volatility -0.557*** 
 
(0.008)    
  
(0.007)    
  
(0.017)    
Lagged Cash 0.119    
 
PPE -0.477*** 
 
CEO Age -0.001*** 
 
(0.074)    
  
(0.042)    
  
(0.000)    
Lagged Leverage 0.087    
 
R&D 1.614*** 
 
CEO Tenure 0.001*** 
 
(0.093)    
  
(0.091)    
  
(0.000)    
Lagged Market-to-Book -0.030*** 
 
Cash -0.040    
 
Firm age -0.001*** 
 
(0.009)    
  
(0.076)    
  
(0.000)    
CEO Age -0.005*** 
 
CEO Age 0.005*** 
 
Constant 0.153*** 
 
(0.001)    
  
(0.002)    
  
(0.009)    
CEO Tenure -0.004**  
 
CEO Tenure -0.004*** 
   
 
(0.001)    
  
(0.001)    
   
CEO Duality -0.053    
 
Firm age 0.006*** 
   
 
(0.155)    
  
(0.001)    
   
Constant 3.750*** 
 
Constant -1.622*** 
   
 
(0.180)    
  
(0.109)    
   
R-sqr 0.151    
 
R-sqr 0.0278  
 
R-sqr 0.2158  
Observations 12657      Observations 12657      Observations 12657    
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Fig. 1 Change in Cash Holdings around Male-to-Female CEO Transitions  
This figure graphs the cash holdings of the 20 companies that had the largest change in cash holdings from the last two years of a male CEO to the first two years of a 
female CEO, excluding the transition year. The last column represents the average change in cash holdings for all male-to-female transition firms. 
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